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The Constitutional Right to
“Establish a Home”
John G. Sprankling*
ABSTRACT
Everyone needs a home. But exclusionary zoning ordinances in many
communities prevent low-income and moderate-income families from securing affordable homes, disproportionately harming people of color. Because
these ordinances satisfy the rational basis test, they have been immune from
substantive due process attack. This Article provides a new method to challenge the constitutionality of exclusionary zoning.
For decades, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to “establish a home.”
The Clause was adopted, in part, as a response to the “Black Codes” enacted
by southern states in the post-Civil War era that prohibited Black Americans
from buying or leasing homes. The Court has frequently mentioned the right
in dicta but has never squarely relied on it to reach a decision. Perhaps for this
reason, it has been overlooked by scholars.
This Article is the first piece of legal scholarship to explore the right to
establish a home. This is a negative right: it bars the government from unduly
interfering with a person’s ability to rent or buy a home. The Article demonstrates that this right is a fundamental right for the purpose of substantive due
process analysis, like the right to marry or the right to raise children. Accordingly, a law that infringes the right must be evaluated under either the strict
scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny tests. Under either test, exclusionary zoning is
probably unconstitutional.
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INTRODUCTION
Meyer v. Nebraska1 is a landmark in constitutional law—the first
time the Supreme Court used the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect personal liberty.2 It remains a cornerstone of modern substantive due process jurisprudence today. As
Professor Peter Nicolas explains, Meyer is “consistently presented by
the Court in support of the contemporary approach to recognizing
and enforcing substantive fundamental rights under the Due Process
Clause.”3 Many of the Court’s most far-reaching decisions—ranging
from Griswold v. Connecticut4 to Obergefell v. Hodges5—have relied
on Meyer.
In a famous passage, Meyer defined the components of “liberty”
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause:
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.6
Over time, all the rights enunciated in Meyer have been the subject of
extensive litigation and intensive scholarly analysis, except for one—
the right to “establish a home.”7 The Court has often referred to this
right but has never formally used it in reaching a decision.8 Lower
courts have utilized the right infrequently, and scholars have ignored
it.9 As a result, the nature and scope of the right to establish a home
remain uncharted.
This Article is the first academic work to analyze the right to establish a home. This is a negative right: it bars the state from unduly
interfering with a person’s ability to rent or buy a home. Although the
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
See id. at 401.
3 Peter Nicolas, Reconstruction, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 937, 958 (2020).
4 See 381 U.S. 479, 481–83, 485 (1965) (recognizing right to use contraceptives).
5 See 576 U.S. 644, 664–65, 667–68 (2015) (recognizing right to marry).
6 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added).
7 Although the Meyer phrasing might imply that the right to establish a home is a component of a larger right that also encompasses the right to marry and the right to bring up children,
later developments made it clear that these are separate rights. See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 246–78, 282–91.
9 See infra notes 279–81, 290.
1
2
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right has a number of potential applications, it is particularly important as a tool for challenging exclusionary zoning ordinances. Many
cities have adopted ordinances that prohibit apartments, condominiums, and other multifamily housing; require large minimum lot sizes
for single-family residences; or bar manufactured homes.10 Indeed,
some cities permit only a particularly expensive form of housing: detached single-family homes on large lots. These ordinances harm the
public by curtailing the types of homes that are available. A person
who is financially able to buy a detached home on a large lot, for
example, might strongly prefer to live in an apartment or condominium. Additionally, exclusionary zoning ordinances effectively prevent
low-income and moderate-income families from securing affordable
homes and disproportionately exclude minority groups.11
No court has decided whether exclusionary zoning violates the
right to establish a home. Notably, however, the Supreme Court has
already held that the right to marry and the right to bring up children—the neighboring rights identified in Meyer—are fundamental
rights for purposes of substantive due process analysis, which invokes
intensive judicial scrutiny.12 Therefore, although the courts have yet to
use the right to establish a home to invalidate exclusionary zoning,
this Article demonstrates how the right could be used for this purpose.
Part I of this Article examines the traditional veneration of the
home in American legal culture. It develops four themes: (1) the
home as a necessity for survival; (2) the home as a sanctuary from
other people and the state; (3) the home as the locus of personal liberty; and (4) the home as the center of family life.
Part II traces the origins of the right to establish a home in American law. In its early stages, the right can be traced from William
Blackstone’s natural law “right of habitation,” through the Declaration of Independence, and to the home-centric Bill of Rights.13 The
right is reflected in a catalogue of nineteenth-century policies ranging
from land bounties for veterans to the Homestead Act of 1862.14 And
concern that southern states would bar emancipated slaves from obSee infra notes 406, 408–09.
See infra note 407 and accompanying text.
12 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015) (“[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right . . . .”); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning
the care, custody, and control of their children.”).
13 See infra text accompanying notes 55–107.
14 Homestead Act of 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-64, 12 Stat. 392; see infra text accompanying
notes 108–26.
10
11
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taining homes helped to spur adoption of the Civil Rights Act of
186615 and the Fourteenth Amendment, leading to express recognition
of the right in Meyer.16
Part III analyzes the right to establish a home, as enunciated in
Meyer and its subsequent evolution. In context, recognition of the
right should be viewed as a libertarian response to early zoning ordinances that imperiled the traditional freedom to obtain a home. This
Part explores later Supreme Court cases and lower court decisions
that have referenced the right and further explained its meaning. Most
recently in Obergefell, which held that the right to marry is a fundamental right, the Court proclaimed that “[t]he right to ‘marry, establish a home and bring up children’ is a central part of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause.”17 Over 400 federal and state
decisions have referred to the right to establish a home, many of
which occurred in the last decade.18
Part IV demonstrates that the right to establish a home is a fundamental right. Under the Obergefell approach to identifying fundamental rights—the technique the Court has used most recently—a
compelling argument can be made that the right to establish a home is
fundamental. Under the older Washington v. Glucksberg19 approach, a
persuasive case can also be made for this result.20 A law that impairs a
fundamental right is ordinarily subject to strict scrutiny. Alternatively,
such a law might be analyzed under intermediate scrutiny, a less demanding standard.
Finally, Part V evaluates the constitutionality of three common
exclusionary zoning techniques: (1) prohibition of multifamily housing; (2) large lot size requirements; and (3) prohibition of manufactured homes. It concludes that these laws are probably
unconstitutional infringements of the fundamental right to establish a
home under both the strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny tests.
I. THE HOME

IN

AMERICAN LAW

American law venerates the home. As the Supreme Court observed in Payton v. New York,21 “overriding respect for the sanctity of
15 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981–1983).
16 See infra text accompanying notes 127–51.
17 Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 668 (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978)).
18 See infra note 232.
19 521 U.S. 702 (1997), superseded by Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644.
20 See infra text accompanying notes 380–96.
21 445 U.S. 573 (1980).

R
R
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the home . . . has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of
the Republic.”22 Similarly, Justice Brennan explained in United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez23: “For over 200 years, our country has considered itself the world’s foremost protector of liberties. The privacy and
sanctity of the home have been primary tenets of our moral, philosophical, and judicial beliefs.”24 Indeed, the Court’s interpretation of
the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments embodies a
“home-centric jurisprudence.”25
In the most basic sense, a home is a house, apartment, or other
physical structure used as a long-term residence. Yet scholars agree
that the concept of home involves far more than a building; it also
connotes the experiences, relationships, and values that are associated
with living in a home.26 For example, Professor Margaret Radin posits
that “[t]he home is a moral nexus between liberty, privacy, and freedom of association.”27 Professor Gerald Dickinson concludes that
“Americans’ admiration ‘for the sanctity of the home’ is linked to the
individual, the family, and the fabric of society.”28 Professor John
Campbell stresses that “a family’s home is important to a person’s
physical, emotional, and financial well-being” and thus is “central to
American culture and identity.”29 And Dean Benjamin Barros notes
that “‘[h]ome’ evokes thoughts of, among many other things, family,
Id. at 601.
494 U.S. 259 (1990).
24 Id. at 285–86 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
25 See, e.g., Gerald S. Dickinson, The Puzzle of the Constitutional Home, 80 OHIO ST. L.J.
1099, 1103, 1109–16 (2019); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 129–30 (2012) (discussing “house-protective” doctrines developed by the Supreme Court); John Campbell, Where Kafka Reigns: A Call
for Metamorphosis in Unlawful Detainer Law, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 557, 564 (2016) (“With
very few exceptions, American law . . . embraces home exceptionalism or ‘home-centric’
ideals.”).
26 As philosopher Michael Allen Fox comments:
There is a strong tendency to identify house and home, and even to use the words
interchangeably. . . . A home is always a house plus many other ingredients; a house
is a home minus many elements. . . . [W]hen we focus too much on the house (or
any dwelling structure) as the essence of home, we neglect the most important components: the interactions among people who live together (relationships) and their
behaviour regarding the objects (possessions, mementos, artifacts, goods, commodities, and so forth) which fit out their home space.
MICHAEL ALLEN FOX, HOME: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 65–66 (2016); see also JOHN S.
ALLEN, HOME: HOW HABITAT MADE US HUMAN 13–54 (2015) (discussing attributes of a
home); JUDITH FLANDERS, THE MAKING OF HOME 166–68 (2014) (discussing the evolving association of “home” with terms like “comfort” and “relaxing”).
27 Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 991 (1982).
28 Dickinson, supra note 25, at 1100 (quoting Radin, supra note 27, at 1013).
29 Campbell, supra note 25, at 564–65.
22
23
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safety, privacy, and community,” which has led to “an ideology of
home where the protection of home and all it stands for is an American virtue.”30 As these comments reflect, four themes explain the centrality of the home in American law.
First, shelter is necessary for human existence.31 As the Court acknowledged in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,32 “the shelter of a
home” is a “prime necessity.”33 American law adopted a laissez-faire
approach to the quality of housing until the twentieth century.34 During this era, people could live in hovels, shanties, or virtually anywhere. With rapid urbanization, however, living conditions in many
cities became abysmal; crime, disease, fire, and overcrowding were
constant dangers.35 Spurred on by the Progressive movement, cities36
eventually began to regulate the nature and quality of housing
through health and safety standards, building codes, and zoning ordinances.37 The unintended consequence of this regulatory expansion
was that some people were unable to obtain homes in communities
where they wanted to live, while others have been forced out of the
housing market altogether.38
Second, the home is a sanctuary against both other people and
the state.39 As an English court phrased the doctrine in 1604, “the
house of every one is to him as his . . . castle and fortress.”40 Eventually this doctrine expanded to restrict interference by the state, as embodied by William Pitt’s 1763 speech to the House of Commons: “The
poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the
30

D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 255

(2006).
See infra text accompanying notes 320–33.
285 U.S. 262 (1932).
33 Id. at 277.
34 See SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 16–18 (1969).
35 See, e.g., JACOB A. RIIS, HOW THE OTHER HALF LIVES: STUDIES AMONG THE TENEMENTS OF NEW YORK 1–3, 10 (1890) (discussing living conditions in New York City tenements);
TOLL, supra note 34, at 21–26, 88 (same).
36 Various types of local governments adopt zoning ordinances, including cities, counties,
towns, and villages. For simplicity, this Article refers to a local government as a “city.”
37 See TOLL, supra note 34, at 18, 26.
38 See, e.g., Jacquelynn Kerubo, What Gentrification Means for Black Homeowners, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/17/realestate/black-homeowners-gentri
fication.html [https://perma.cc/GR5J-MS6M] (focusing on how Black Americans have been
priced out of homeownership in New York).
39 See infra text accompanying notes 334–48; see also Barros, supra note 30, at 259–69
(discussing security in the home); Dickinson, supra note 25, at 1113–16 (discussing Fourth
Amendment protections).
40 Semayne’s Case (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195; 5 Co. Rep. 91 a, 91 b.
31

R

32

R

R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\90-3\GWN302.txt

2022]

unknown

Seq: 8

23-JUN-22

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO “ESTABLISH A HOME”

9:03

639

Crown.”41 American law has long embraced the castle doctrine, which
allows a man to defend his home against criminal intrusion.42 As the
Court explained in Wilson v. Layne,43 “[t]he Fourth Amendment embodies this centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the
home.”44 It noted that “[p]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”45
Third, the home is essential for protection of personal liberty.46
The Court has consistently viewed the home as a place where constitutional rights receive enhanced protection.47 For example, in Stanley v.
Georgia,48 it held that a person has a First Amendment right to possess obscene material “to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs
in the privacy of his own home.”49 And in Griswold v. Connecticut, the
Court identified a “zone of privacy” in the home arising from “several
fundamental constitutional guarantees”—including the Third and
Fourth Amendments.50 In the process, it posed a rhetorical question:
“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?”51
Finally, the home is the center of family life. The Court noted in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland52 that “the Constitution protects the
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”53 The Court explained that “[i]t is through the family that we inculcate and pass
down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”54 This
goal can be realized only in a home.
41 Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 378–79 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting William Pitt, Speech on the Excise Bill to the House of Commons (Mar. 1763)).
42 See, e.g., People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914) (“It is not now and never has
been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling is bound to retreat. If assailed there, he may
stand his ground and resist the attack.”).
43

526 U.S. 603 (1999).

44

Id. at 610.

45

Id. (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)).

See infra text accompanying notes 349–65; see also Barros, supra note 30, at 269–75
(discussing privacy in the home).
46

47

See Dickinson, supra note 25, at 1107–17.

48

394 U.S. 557 (1969).

49

Id. at 565.

50

381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965) (upholding the right to obtain contraceptives).

51

Id. at 485.

52

431 U.S. 494 (1977).

53

Id. at 503.

54

Id. at 503–04.
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A

HOME

A. A Traditional Right
For millennia, people were free to establish homes without governmental interference. William Blackstone posited that the right to a
home evolved in a “state of nature”:
As human life . . . grew more and more refined, [an] abundance of conveniences were devised to render it more easy,
commodious, and agreeable; as, habitations for shelter and
safety, and raiment for warmth and decency. . . . In the case
of habitations in particular, it was natural to observe, that
even the brute creation, to whom every thing else was in
common, maintained a kind of permanent property in their
dwellings . . . the birds of the air had nests, and the beasts of
the field had caverns . . . . Hence a property was soon established in every man’s house and home-stall.55
Over three centuries—from the founding of the first European
colonies in North America until the widespread adoption of zoning
ordinances in the early twentieth century—a white male American
was generally56 free to rent or buy a home wherever he wished.57 This
decision was viewed as a private matter, not a public concern. Indeed,
virtually everyone had a home of some sort, however humble.58 Looking back at this era, the Supreme Court proclaimed in Meyer v. Nebraska in 1923 that the right to “establish a home” was one of the
rights “long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”59
This right evolved from two foundational themes in American
law: the right to acquire property and the importance of the home.
Under the republican ideology that dominated the founding era, a
central purpose of government was to safeguard property rights. As
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *4.
Traditional American property law was pervaded by gender and racial bias. Married
women were legally incapable of acquiring property until the widespread adoption of the Married Women’s Property Acts in the nineteenth century. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING
PROPERTY LAW 154–58 (4th ed. 2017). Black Americans and other minority groups did not hold
equal rights to obtain property until Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), clarified
the scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. All references to the scope of the right to acquire
property as a general matter, and the right to establish a home in particular, are subject to these
caveats.
57 See infra text accompanying notes 85–86, 114, 162.
58 As the 1823 song Home, Sweet Home proclaimed: “Be it ever so humble, there’s no
place like home.” JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 405 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed.
1992).
59 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
55
56
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James Madison declared, “[g]overnment is instituted to protect property of every sort.”60 This necessarily required that government safeguard the right to acquire property in the first instance. Yet the special
status of the home did not stem simply from its role as a form of property. As discussed above, the home was necessary for survival, provided security against other people and the state, was vital for
personal liberty, and served as the center of family life.61
B. Colonial America
English law traditionally afforded special protection to the home.
For example, a 1615 decision stressed “[t]he pre-eminence and privilege which the law gives to houses which are for men’s habitation.”62
As Sir Edward Coke explained in 1644 in his influential Institutes of
the Laws of England, “a man’s house is his castle, & domus sua cuique
est tutissimum refugium [and each man’s home is his safest refuge];
for where shall a man be safe, if it be not in his house?”63 Colonial
America inherited this tradition.
Perhaps the biggest difference between colonial America and England was the availability of land. In England, real property was the
source of economic power, political influence, and social status.64 But
land was usually held in fee tail so that it could be passed down to
successive generations in the same family.65 As a result, most people
could not hope to own freehold estates.66 But when Europeans discovered North America, almost the entire continent was an unowned wilderness.67 In colonial America, almost any white male could obtain a
fee simple estate, and many emigrated to the colonies to obtain land.68
Thus, as historian James Ely observed, “[a] widely shared desire to
60 JAMES MADISON, PROPERTY, PAPERS 14:266–68 (Mar. 29, 1792), reprinted in 1 THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 598, 598 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
61 See supra Part I; infra Section IV.B.3.
62 Lewis Bowles’s Case (1615) 77 Eng. Rep. 1252, 1257; 11 Co. Rep. 79 b, 82 a.
63 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 162 (1644); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223 (“[T]he law of England has so particular and tender a
regard to the immunity of a man’s house, that it styles it his castle and will never suffer it to be
violated with impunity . . . .”).
64 SPRANKLING, supra note 56, at 118.
65 Id.
66 JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 11–12 (3d ed. 2008).
67 RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 7 (3d ed. 1982). At least
Europeans perceived it in this manner. Id.
68 PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 66 (1997) (“[F]or the first time
in human history, cheap, good land was available to the multitude.”).
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acquire and enjoy property has long been one of the most distinctive
features of American society.”69
During the colonial era, the right to acquire land and establish a
home, either by purchase or lease, was unquestioned. John Locke’s
postulate that ownership of property was a natural right strongly influenced colonial thought. “For the preservation of Property being the
end of Government, and that for which Men enter into Society,” he
wrote, “it necessarily supposes and requires, that the People should
have Property.”70 Blackstone—who was considered “the preeminent
authority on English law” at the time71—provided more specific guidance. The “principal aim of society,” he reasoned, is to protect the
“absolute rights” of individuals that would arise in a state of nature,
including the “right of private property” and the “right of personal
liberty.”72 The entire second volume of his treatise examined “those
rights which a man may acquire in . . . property.”73
For Blackstone, property was “that sole and despotic dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the
world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the
universe.”74 This absolutist approach naturally extended to establishing a home. He explained that “personal liberty consists in the power
of loco-motion, of changing situation, or removing one’s person to
whatsoever place one’s own inclination may direct.”75 He referred to
this as “that right of habitation, which every individual might acquire
even in a state of nature.”76
Rather than restrict the right to establish a home, government
policy during the colonial era helped to fulfill the right by promoting
frontier settlement. Under the headright system used early in the era,
unappropriated land was freely granted to anyone willing to “settle
upon it, subdue it, and establish a home upon it.”77 Eventually, the
Crown began selling land to settlers for a “nominal fee” and granted
land freely in return for military service.78 Finally, squatters who “esELY, supra note 66, at xi.
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 138, reprinted in TWO TREATISES
OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1988) (1690).
71 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999).
72 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *124, *129.
73 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 55, at *1.
74 Id. at *2.
75 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 72, at *134.
76 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 63, at *223.
77 MARSHALL HARRIS, ORIGIN OF THE LAND TENURE SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES
401–02 (1953).
78 See id. at 399–400.
69
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tablished possessory rights by the construction of houses, barns,
fences, and other improvements . . . and by clearing and cultivating it”
usually obtained formal ownership “without significant cost.”79
Colonial law placed virtually no limits on the right to acquire
property and establish a home.80 The vast majority of people lived and
worked on farms,81 where the settler who acquired land typically built
his own house and supported his family by raising crops.82 Thus, for
most colonists there was not a sharp distinction between homes and
other types of property. The implicit right to acquire property naturally encompassed both. Certainly, piecemeal restrictions affecting
homes were occasionally adopted in cities. Official maps might lay out
the planned locations for lots.83 And some cities required that homes
be constructed of brick or stone to minimize the risk of fire, or mandated that nuisance-like uses, such as slaughterhouses and distilleries,
be restricted to certain areas.84 But beyond this point, government
simply did not regulate land use.
In sum, as the Supreme Court observed in United States v.
Wheeler,85 “[i]n all the States from the beginning down to the adoption
of the Articles of Confederation the citizens thereof possessed the
fundamental right . . . peacefully to dwell within the limits of their
respective States.”86 The right to acquire property and the unique status of the home were central themes in the newly independent United
States. Reflecting on this era, the Court later explained in the Slaughter-House Cases87 that “the right to acquire . . . property of every
79

Id. at 401.

As Morton Horwitz summarized: “In the eighteenth century, the right to property had
been the right to absolute dominion over land . . . a static agrarian conception entitling an owner
to undisturbed enjoyment . . . .” MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1780–1860, at 31 (1977).
80

81 See SONIA A. HIRT, ZONED IN THE USA 113 (2014). As late as 1776, 98% of the population lived outside of cities. Id.
82 By 1750, “the vast majority of white adult males in the colonies owned land,” which
usually included a home. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA TO
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 54 (2001); see also ELY, supra note 66, at 27–28 (“Easy availability of land had long characterized colonial society, and by the time of the revolutionary crisis the
ownership of land was widespread.”).
83 For example, William Penn’s 1682 renowned plan for Philadelphia was one of the first
examples of American city planning; other notable plans included Savannah, Georgia and Washington, D.C. See HIRT, supra note 81, at 112.
84

See id. at 111–12.

85

254 U.S. 281 (1920).

86

Id. at 293.

87

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
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kind” was one of the “fundamental principles” that had existed since
the nation became “free, independent, and sovereign.”88
C. Independence
The Declaration of Independence indirectly recognized the right
to establish a home as a matter of natural law. It proclaimed that “all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, [and] that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness.”89 Thomas Jefferson based this phrase
on Virginia’s draft Declaration of Rights, written by George Mason.90
The first paragraph of Mason’s Declaration provided:
[A]ll men are born equally free and independant [sic], and
have certain inherent natural rights, of which they cannot, by
any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; among which
are the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety.91
Historian Pauline Maier explains that Jefferson shortened the final
phrase to “life, liberty, & the pursuit of happiness” during the drafting
process.92 She suggests that Jefferson used the words “pursuit of happiness” because “he meant to say more economically and movingly
what Mason stated with some awkwardness and at considerably
greater length.”93 Maier concludes that “[t]he inherent right to pursue
happiness probably also included ‘the means of acquiring and possessing property.’”94 Indeed, Jefferson envisioned an agrarian nation
where farmers who owned their own lands—and necessarily their
homes—would provide the “virtue and judgment” necessary for republican government.95
Id. at 76.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
90 See PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 125–27 (1998).
91 Id. at 126–27.
92 Id. at 134.
93 Id.
94 Id.; see also ELY, supra note 66, at 29 (“The right to obtain and possess property was at
the heart of the pursuit of happiness. Still, Jefferson’s formulation was significant because it
stressed the importance of acquiring property rather than just the protection of existing property
arrangements.”).
95 Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America,
19 J.L. & ECON. 467, 475 (1976). Katz stresses that “the right to property was an unquestioned
assumption of the American revolutionaries.” Id. at 469–70. As Thomas Jefferson explained,
“[w]henever there is in any country, uncultivated lands and unemployed poor, it is clear that the
laws of property have been so far extended as to violate natural right.” Letter from Thomas
88
89
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The Supreme Court has suggested that the phrase “pursuit of
happiness” includes the right to establish a home. In Board of Regents
of State Colleges v. Roth, 96 it defined the “liberty” protected by the
Due Process Clause to include a list of specific rights—including the
“right . . . [to] establish a home . . . and generally . . . those privileges
long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.”97 In context, the right to establish a home and the other
listed rights are specific examples of the liberties that are essential to
the “pursuit of happiness.”
Scholars describe the Constitution as home-centric because it extends special protections to homes—particularly as developed in the
Court’s jurisprudence over the last century.98 For example, the Third
Amendment guarantees that soldiers cannot be quartered in any
“house” without the consent of the owner,99 and the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches of “houses,”100 reflecting
the importance that the Framers placed on the home. As Professor
Akhil Amar notes:
[N]othing in the written Constitution explicitly demands special protection of “houses” . . . but surely the document invites judges (and other interpreters) to attend to this explicit
word . . . in pondering which unenumerated rights are properly claimed by the people. . . .
. . . [T]he Justices have in fact developed a case law of both
enumerated rights and unenumerated rights that recognizes
the special significance of houses and what happens inside
them.101
These amendments indicate that the Framers assumed the existence of
an underlying right to establish a home.102
In context, the amendments that the states requested were largely
the product of history—both the turmoil in seventeenth-century EnJefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 681, 682
(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1953).
96 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
97 Id. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
98 See Dickinson, supra note 25, at 1109–16.
99 U.S. CONST. amend. III.
100 Id. amend. IV.
101 Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1773 (2011).
102 Cf. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966) (holding that the right to travel is a
fundamental right even though it does not appear in the text of the Constitution). As one scholar
interprets the decision, “[t]he Court explained that the right to travel was absent from the text of
the Constitution because as a right so basic, it was simply assumed to exist.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 881 (4th ed. 2011).
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gland that led to the 1689 Declaration of Rights and the perceived
British abuses of the colonies before independence.103 Adoption of the
Bill of Rights was driven by anti-Federalist anxiety that the new government might engage in similar conduct.104 But because the Crown
had never interfered with the traditional right to establish a home,
there was no need to list it as a specific right.
More broadly, James Ely observes that “the right to acquire and
own property was undoubtedly a paramount value for the framers of
the Constitution.”105 For example, James Madison stated that “[t]he
personal right to acquire property, which is a natural right, gives to
property, when acquired, a right to protection, as a social right.”106
Indeed, the Takings Clause and the property component of the Due
Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment would be meaningless unless
there was an underlying right to acquire property.107
D. Antebellum Era
American courts firmly endorsed the right to acquire property in
the antebellum era.108 The federal circuit court in Vanhorne’s Lessee v.
Dorrance,109 for example, held that a state law which terminated the
plaintiff’s title to a home and farm was unconstitutional.110 Sitting as a
circuit justice, Supreme Court Justice William Paterson observed that
“the right of acquiring and possessing property, and having it pro103 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966 (1991) (noting that the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment was derived from the Declaration of
Rights).
104 As historian Leonard Levy notes, the Bill of Rights “was a bill of restraints on the
United States.” LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 11–12 (1999).
105 ELY, supra note 66, at 43.
106 James Madison, Speech in the Virginia Constitutional Convention (Dec. 2, 1829), in
THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 402,
402–03 (Marvin Meyers ed., Univ. Press of New Eng. rev. ed. 1981).
107 See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3–4.
108 Leading scholars of the era echoed this view. Melding the approaches taken by Blackstone and Jefferson, James Kent declared that one of the “absolute rights of individuals” was
“the right to acquire and enjoy property.” 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1
(1827). He noted that this right had been “justly considered, and frequently declared, by the
people of this country, to be natural, inherent, and unalienable.” Id. In turn, Theodore Sedgwick
quoted Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230), to explain that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause encompassed “the right to acquire and possess property of
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety.” THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE
ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 601–02 (1857) (quoting Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551–52).
109 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 28 F. Cas. 1012 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16857).
110 See id.
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tected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of
man.”111
In turn, Justice Bushrod Washington provided the first influential
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Corfield v.
Coryell112 by identifying the “fundamental” rights “which have, at all
times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent,
and sovereign.”113 Echoing the Declaration of Independence, two of
the rights he listed were the “enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
right to acquire and possess property of every kind” and “[t]he
right . . . to reside in any other state.”114 In combination, the right to
acquire property and the right to reside reflected an early recognition
of the right to establish a home.
The land policies of the federal government during this period
were designed to encourage the settlement of western lands, consistent with Jefferson’s vision of a nation populated by independent
farmers.115 As the Supreme Court explained in Van Ness v. Pacard,116
“[t]he country was a wilderness, and the universal policy was to procure its cultivation and improvement.”117
Rather than restrict the right to establish a home, the government
facilitated it. Under the Land Ordinance of 1785,118 the government
began selling public lands at a “sale price [that] was not too high for
the settler.”119 Military bounties allowed veterans of the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Mexican War to obtain land without
payment.120 Squatting was widespread; and under the Preemption Act
of 1841, the government eventually allowed the squatter who had “inhabited and improved the land, [and] erected a dwelling on it”121 to
purchase it for a low price.122 Finally, under the Homestead Act of
Id. at 310.
6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
113 Id. at 551.
114 Id. at 551–52.
115 See Katz, supra note 95 and accompanying text.
116 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137 (1829).
117 Id. at 145.
118 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 375 (John C. Fitzpatrick
ed., 1933).
119 HARRIS, supra note 77, at 400.
120 See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 251–54, 262–63,
270–73 (1968).
121 Id. at 238.
122 See HARRIS, supra note 77, at 401; see also GATES, supra note 120, at 238–39 (discussing
preemption).
111
112

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\G\GWN\90-3\GWN302.txt

648

unknown

Seq: 17

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

23-JUN-22

9:03

[Vol. 90:632

1862,123 a settler could obtain 160 acres of land “for the purpose of
actual settlement” for ten dollars, as long as he resided on and cultivated the land for five years.124 As the Court observed in Buchser v.
Buchser,125 “the policy of the [homestead] statute . . . is to enable the
settler and his family to secure a home.”126
E. Post-Civil War Era
Congress adopted the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, and it
took effect upon ratification in 1868. Section 1 contains its Due Process Clause, which provides, “[N]or shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”127 Section 1
was motivated in part by concern that southern states would prevent
emancipated slaves from obtaining homes and other property—thus
interfering with the right to establish a home.
The legislative history of Section 1 is scant.128 It was primarily
intended to constitutionalize the protections set forth in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.129 Accordingly, the provisions of the Act help to
interpret the scope of the Due Process Clause.130 As Justice Brennan
explained in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,131 “[t]he main targets of
the [Act] were the ‘Black Codes,’ enacted in Southern States after the
Thirteenth Amendment was passed”—laws that were “poorly disguised substitutes for slavery.”132 Notably, the Act protected the right
to “inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property”—which included the right to establish a home.133
Homestead Act of 1862, Pub. L. No. 37-64, § 2, 12 Stat. 392.
Id. at 392; GATES, supra note 120, at 395. Ultimately, over 1,400,000 homesteads were
successfully established. HIRT, supra note 81, at 116.
125 231 U.S. 157 (1913).
126 Id. at 162.
127 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3. All references hereinafter to the “Due Process
Clause” refer to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
128 See SIEGAN, supra note 82, at 237 (noting that debate on Section 1 in the Senate and
House of Representatives was “not very extensive”).
129 Id. at 226 (“While opinion was divergent as to the full meaning of Section 1 of the
proposed Fourteenth Amendment, commentators generally agreed that it was intended to authorize passage of and constitutionalize the principles of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 . . . .”).
130 See Kurt T. Lash, Enforcing the Rights of Due Process: The Original Relationship Between the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 106 GEO. L.J. 1389, 1391 (2018)
(“Scholars have long looked to the 1866 Civil Rights Act for clues to the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
131 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
132 Id. at 672 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal
123
124
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The congressional debates preceding adoption of the Act indicate
that its property protections encompassed this right. For instance,
Congressman William Windom complained that “[t]he State laws of
Georgia and South Carolina prohibit any negro from buying or leasing a home.”134 Other legislators noted that similar laws existed in
Mississippi135 and Louisiana.136 Windom rhetorically asked: “Do you
call him a freeman who is denied that most sacred of all possessions, a
home?”137
In the same vein, Senator Jacob Howard argued that opponents
of the bill would permit the former Confederate states to declare that:
[N]o negro who has once been a slave shall ever . . . have the
right or privilege of earning and purchasing property; of having a home under which to shelter him and his family . . . thus
leaving it in the power of these interested States to expatriate him at any moment and drive him beyond their limits
[and] to deprive him of a home . . . .138
Howard asked: “Is a freeman to be deprived of the right of acquiring
property, of the right of having a family, a wife, children, home?”139 In
turn, Congressman Martin Thayer challenged the right of southern
states to adopt “laws which prevent the enjoyment of the fundamental
rights of citizenship; laws which declare, for example, that [former
slaves] shall not have the privilege of purchasing a home for themselves and their families.”140
Senator Lyman Trumbull, who introduced the bill in the Senate,
and Congressman James Wilson, who sponsored it in the House of
Representatives, both asserted that the rights it guaranteed were already protected by the Constitution.141 After quoting at length from
Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 39 (1990) (suggesting that the Thirteenth Amendment should be viewed as creating a positive “right to sustenance and shelter” for freed slaves).
134 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1160 (1866).
135 Mississippi law prohibited “the holding, leasing, or renting of real estate by freedmen.”
Id.
136 An ordinance in one Louisiana town provided that “[n]o negro or freeman shall be
permitted to rent or keep a house within the limits of the town under any circumstances” and
similar ordinances were adopted by other towns in the state. Report of Carl Schurz, S. EXEC.
DOC. NO. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1865).
137 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1160 (1866).
138 Id. at 504.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1151; see also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 428 (1968) (“[O]ne of
the most comprehensive studies . . . before Congress [when the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
adopted] . . . noted the existence of laws virtually prohibiting Negroes from owning or renting
property in certain towns . . . .”).
141 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475–76, 1117 (1866).
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Justice Washington’s decision in Corfield v. Coryell, Trumbull described “the right to acquire property” and other rights specified in
the bill as “fundamental rights belonging to every man as a free man,
and which under the Constitution as it now exists we have a right to
protect every man in.”142 Wilson agreed that the object of the bill was
“to protect and enforce those [rights] which already belong to every
citizen.”143 Quoting James Kent’s Commentaries on American Law, he
stated that the “right to acquire and enjoy property” and other rights
in the bill were “natural, inherent, and inalienable.”144
Ultimately, the rights guaranteed by the Civil Rights Act of 1866
resembled the Corfield formulation, including the rights to purchase
and lease property.145 Reflecting on the Act in the Civil Rights
Cases,146 the Supreme Court observed that it protected “those fundamental rights which appertain to the essence of citizenship.”147 As historian Eric Foner summarizes, the Act was “the first statutory
definition of the rights of American citizenship.”148
Four years after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court recognized that it was intended, in part, to protect the right to
obtain a home. In the Slaughter-House Cases, it noted that the former
Confederate states adopted “laws which imposed upon the colored
race onerous disabilities and burdens, and curtailed their rights in the
pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an extent that their freedom was of little value.”149 The Court continued: “They were in some
States forbidden to appear in the towns in any other character than
menial servants. They were required to reside on and cultivate the soil
without the right to purchase or own it.”150 Thus, emancipated slaves
were unable to own the homes where they lived or the farms where
they labored. In order to deal with this concern and other problems,
the Court explained, legislators “accordingly passed through Congress
the proposition for the Fourteenth Amendment.”151
Id. at 475–76.
Id. at 1117.
144 Id. at 1118 (quoting 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1 (1827)).
145 See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981–1983).
146 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
147 Id. at 22.
148 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at
244 (1988).
149 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1872).
150 Id.
151 Id.
142
143
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F. Lochner Era
The rapid industrialization and urbanization that characterized
the late nineteenth century produced a fundamental change in the Supreme Court’s attitude toward property.152 Business enterprises argued that the Due Process Clause insulated them from unreasonable
state legislation that interfered with property rights.153 Over time, the
Court developed a series of doctrines that limited the scope of state
regulation by broadly protecting economic liberty, initially through reliance on the Contract Clause but eventually by developing the concept of substantive due process.154 The symbolic triumph of economic
liberty was Lochner v. New York,155 where the Court held that a statute limiting the working hours for bakery workers violated the Fourteenth Amendment.156
A series of Court decisions from this era endorsed the right to
acquire property—usually in the context of shielding business entities
from state regulation. For instance, in the 1888 decision of Powell v.
Pennsylvania,157 the Court stated that the “privilege . . . of acquiring,
holding, and selling property” was protected by the Due Process
Clause.158 Ten years later, in Holden v. Hardy,159 it struck the same
theme by observing that the “phrase ‘due process of law’” protected
that right:
As the possession of property, of which a person cannot be
deprived, doubtless implies that such property may be acquired, it is safe to say that a state law which undertakes to
deprive any class of persons of the general power to acquire
property would also be obnoxious to the same provision.160
The Court also acknowledged the right to reside in a place of
one’s choice—which indirectly recognized the right to establish a
home. Writing for the majority in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,161 Justice
Peckham addressed the meaning of “liberty” as used in the Due ProSee ELY, supra note 66, at 8.
See, e.g., Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 686 (1888).
154 See ELY, supra note 66, at 7.
155 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
156 Id. at 45.
157 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
158 Id. at 684. This holding was foreshadowed by Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885),
where the Court commented that the Fourteenth Amendment was “undoubtedly intended” to
assure “that all persons should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness and acquire and
enjoy property.” Id. at 31.
159 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
160 Id. at 390–91.
161 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
152
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cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the first time, identifying specific rights encompassed by the clause:
The “liberty” mentioned in that amendment means not only
the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is
deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the
enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to use them in all
lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which
may be proper, necessary and essential to his carrying out to
a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned. 162
During this era, the concept of the home began to evolve, influenced by the same currents that reshaped the Court’s property jurisprudence. In preindustrial society, the home was often both a
residence and a workplace.163 But as the century progressed, work increasingly occurred outside the home on premises owned by an employer.164 In this changing environment, the home took on new
meaning as the center of family life, a private retreat from the outside
world, and a symbol of autonomy.165 By the early twentieth century,
“[e]stablishment of a separate household by a newly formed family, as
well as the maintenance of household headship in the later years of
life, were sacred values and markers of autonomy in American
society.”166
At the same time, however, inspired either by the Progressive
movement or by racial animus, some cities began to adopt ordinances
that restricted land use—and thereby began to imperil the right to
establish a home.167 For example, the 1912 case of Eubank v. City of
Richmond168 marked the first time that the Court struck down a land
use ordinance—and it involved a home. The Court reasoned that the
162 Id. at 589 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293 (1920)
(affirming that citizens held the “fundamental right . . . peacefully to dwell within the limits of
their respective States”).
163 See FLANDERS, supra note 26, at 49 (discussing the impact of industrialization on the
nature of the home). For example, “in New York City, in 1800, less than 5 per cent of men had a
workplace outside the house . . . and by 1840 it was 70 per cent.” Id.
164 See id.
165 Tamara K. Hareven, The Home and the Family in Historical Perspective, 58 SOC. RSCH.
253, 256–60, 274 (1991), reprinted in HOME: A PLACE IN THE WORLD 227, 230–34, 248 (Arien
Mack ed., 1993).
166 Id. at 256.
167 See infra text accompanying notes 202–03, 239–40.
168 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
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ordinance, which allowed neighbors to establish a building setback
line between the street and the houses on a particular block, violated
the Due Process Clause.169 The equities favored the plaintiff, who had
obtained a building permit and purchased the needed materials before
his neighbors decided to create a setback line; and, even then, the
planned home conformed to the line, aside from a minor window protrusion.170 The decision signaled the Court’s concern that land use regulation might go too far.
The Court’s 1917 decision in Buchanan v. Warley171 foreshadowed the right to establish a home that it later enunciated in Meyer v.
Nebraska.172 The ordinance at issue in Buchanan made it “unlawful
for any colored person to move into and occupy as a residence . . . any
house upon any block upon which a greater number of houses are
occupied as residences . . . by white people.”173 In order to test the
ordinance, Warley, a Black man, entered into a contract to purchase a
residential lot from Buchanan “for the purpose of having erected
thereon a house which I propose to make my residence.”174 Warley
then refused to perform the contract because the ordinance barred
him from living on the property, and Buchanan sued for specific performance.175 Citing Holden v. Hardy, the Court explained: “Property
is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that
it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitution
protects these essential attributes of property.”176 It relied on the Due
Process Clause in striking down the ordinance:
We think this attempt to prevent the alienation of the property in question to a person of color was not a legitimate
exercise of the police power of the State, and is in direct violation of the fundamental law enacted in the Fourteenth
See id. at 140, 143–44.
See id. at 141–42; see also Joseph Gordon Hylton, Prelude to Euclid: The United States
Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Land Use Regulation, 1900–1920, 3 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 1, 34 (2000) (noting that during this era the Court “routinely upheld the legitimacy of
local land use controls” in cases involving commercial properties).
171 245 U.S. 60 (1917). For helpful analysis of Buchanan, see James W. Ely, Jr., Buchanan
and the Right to Acquire Property, 48 CUMB. L. REV. 423 (2018); and James W. Ely, Jr., Reflections on Buchanan v. Warley, Property Rights, and Race, 51 VAND. L. REV. 953 (1998).
172 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
173 Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 70–71.
174 Id. at 69, 73.
175 This was a collusive lawsuit brought to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance.
See Richard A. Epstein, Lest We Forget: Buchanan v. Warley and Constitutional Jurisprudence of
the “Progressive Era,” 51 VAND. L. REV. 787, 788 (1998) (noting that the case “was a staged
litigation challenge”).
176 Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 74.
169
170
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Amendment of the Constitution preventing state interference with property rights except by due process of law.177
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

TO

ESTABLISH

A

HOME

A. Meyer v. Nebraska
The Supreme Court expressly recognized the right to establish a
home in the 1923 decision of Meyer v. Nebraska.178 Yet long before
Meyer, this right was seen as “essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men,”179 as discussed in Part II. From the colonial period
through the Lochner era, the American legal system protected the
right through a variety of doctrines, just as federal government policy
facilitated fulfillment of the right. As the Court acknowledged two
years before it decided Meyer, “[h]ouses are a necessary of life.”180
Meyer is an enigma. Scholars celebrate it as the cornerstone of
contemporary substantive due process jurisprudence—“the first modern civil rights case,”181 “the seminal decision for non-economic substantive due process,”182 and a “liberal icon[].”183 Together with Pierce
v. Society of Sisters,184 Meyer served as the foundation for the Court’s
expansion of individual rights in areas such as abortion, birth control,
family relations, and marriage.185 Yet the decision was rendered in the
middle of the Lochner era by a staunchly conservative Court.186
Technically, the Meyer holding is narrow. The Court merely held
that a state law that prohibited teaching a foreign language to students
who had not passed the eighth grade violated the Due Process
Clause.187 The decision is notable in part because it represents the
Court’s first use of substantive due process to protect personal liber177
178
179
180
181

Id. at 82.
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
See id. at 399.
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 161 (1921).
Louise Weinberg, The McReynolds Mystery Solved, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 133, 133

(2011).
182 William G. Ross, A Judicial Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska in Historical Perspective, 57 U.
CIN. L. REV. 125, 126 (1988).
183 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child
as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 996 (1992).
184 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
185 See infra text accompanying notes 282–91.
186 Exploring the Court’s reinterpretation of Meyer and Pierce over time, Professor Peter
Nicolas concludes that these decisions “hold the record for the number of times a decision has
been judicially reconstructed.” Nicolas, supra note 3, at 956.
187 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400, 402–03 (1923).
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ties—in this case the defendant teacher’s “right . . . to teach and the
right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children.”188
But the decision is best known for its catalogue of individual
rights. Writing for the Court, Justice McReynolds stressed that “the
individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected.”189
He proclaimed in dicta that the “liberty” guaranteed by the clause
encompassed a broad range of rights:
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to
engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men.190
He explained that a state could not interfere with these rights by legislation that was “arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect.”191 Today the Meyer
list is still the accepted standard for defining the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause.192
Although McReynolds cited thirteen prior Court decisions as authority for his catalogue, none of these precedents involved individual
liberties. Rather, they all dealt with challenges to laws that burdened
economic rights.193 The Meyer catalogue was apparently based on Justice Peckham’s pioneering list of mainly economic liberties in Allgeyer
v. Louisiana, decided twenty-six years earlier.194 But McReynolds reformulated the list by shifting its focus from economic rights to personal rights—in an echo of the Declaration of Independence.195
188

Id. at 400.

189

Id. at 401.

190

Id. at 399 (emphasis added).

191

Id. at 400.

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 102, at 577–78 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 572 (1972)); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 679 (2d ed. 1988)
(quoting Meyer). As Tribe notes, Meyer has “remained [a] durable and fertile source[] of constitutional doctrine concerning the nature of liberty.” Id. at 1318.
192

R

193 See, e.g., Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City
Livestock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884) (right to contract); Truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (right to earn a livelihood); Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917)
(right to engage in lawful business).
194

See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).

195

See supra notes 89–97 and accompanying text.
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In context, the Meyer formulation was a libertarian response to
the Progressive movement. Professor Robert Post posits that McReynolds and his fellow Justices were concerned that the rising tide of
Progressive legislation, coupled with the expansion of federal regulatory power during World War I, threatened personal rights that individuals had traditionally enjoyed.196 He notes that—particularly in
Meyer—the Court “extended constitutional protections to remarkably
diffuse and undifferentiated aspects of ordinary experience, far exceeding merely economic transactions.”197 Its goal, he argues, was to
“safeguard that realm from unjustifiable interference” by the state.198
As such, “Meyer can be read as extending ‘fundamental rights’ to the
kinds of cultural practices deemed necessary to sustain the individuality presupposed by democracy.”199
In a similar vein, Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse observes that contemporary commentators “viewed the decision[] . . . as,
above all, championing the individual’s right to control his own [children]—free from government interference.”200 More ominously, Professor Steven Macias suggests that the motivation for the decision
“was not a charitable concern for the preservation of a pluralistic society, but rather an anti-progressive philosophy grounded in social Darwinian ideology.”201
Neither Meyer nor any of the precedents that McReynolds cited
involved a home.202 It is probable the inclusion of the right to establish
a home was a reaction to the rapid spread of zoning ordinances, a core
theme of the Progressive movement.203 New York City adopted the
196 See Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in the Taft Court
Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489, 1494–95, 1530–31 (1998).
197 Id. at 1530.
198 Id. at 1532.
199 Id. at 1534 (footnote omitted).
200 Woodhouse, supra note 183, at 1090. She interprets the recognition of the right
“to . . . bring up children” as a reaction to the fact that “the family citadel was crumbling under
assaults from common schooling, child welfare, juvenile justice, child labor laws, and a host of
government assumptions of paternal prerogatives designed to standardize child-rearing and
make it responsive to community values.” Id. at 1087 n.506, 1090.
201 Steven J. Macias, The Huck Finn Syndrome in History and Theory: The Origins of Family Privacy, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 87, 89 (2010). He notes that McReynolds had a “nasty, racist,
anti-Semitic temperament.” Id. at 101.
202 Lofty opening definitions of liberty . . . notwithstanding, there is simply no right to
marry, establish a home, or bear children at stake in the Meyer case. . . . [T]he
problem in Meyer is not state interference in the intimacies of home and family . . . .
Susan E. Lawrence, Substantive Due Process and Parental Rights: From Meyer v. Nebraska to
Troxel v. Granville, 8 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 71, 77 (2006).
203 MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, THE ZONING OF AMERICA: Euclid v. Ambler 30 (2008) (“Zon-
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first comprehensive ordinance in 1916, and other cities soon followed
its example.204 These early ordinances were modest in scope; each city
was divided into geographic zones where different uses were permitted, with limits on the size and location of buildings, including homes.
The widespread adoption of zoning ordinances signaled a shift
away from the American tradition that allowed individuals to establish homes as they wished, with minimal governmental interference.
As the Supreme Court later explained in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,205 “[r]egulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of
which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are
now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago,
probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive.”206
B. Meaning of “Establish a Home”
The phrase “establish a home” was not a legal term of art when
Meyer was decided. However, a number of factors indicate that the
Court intended the phrase to refer to a person’s right to lease or
purchase a house, apartment, or other dwelling as a long-term residence and to begin living in that dwelling.207
The Court used the phrase as part of a sequence: “to marry, establish a home and bring up children.” 208 This suggests a temporal
relationship: people marry, then they establish a home, and finally
they raise children. 209 In this context, “home” connotes a long-term
residence for a family to inhabit, rather than a temporary accommodation such as a room in a hotel or boarding house. Further, the term
“establish” indicates the holder of the right will both obtain a home
and begin living there.
This interpretation is consistent with dictionary definitions from
the era. The leading American dictionary, Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary, defined “home” as “[o]ne’s own dwelling place;
the house in which one lives; esp., the house in which one lives with
ing as an American legal institution is readily identified with the Progressive Era. . . . In many
ways, zoning is a quintessential Progressive concept.”).
204 See id. at 27.
205 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
206 Id. at 387.
207 In a broad sense, of course, a “home” is more than a house or structure—because the
term connotes the manner in which people use the property. See supra text accompanying notes
26–30. But at a minimum, a “home” connotes a house or other dwelling unit used as a long-term
residence, and that is the sense in which the Meyer Court used it.
208 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
209 Later developments make it clear that the right to establish a home is not limited to
married couples. See infra note 238.
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his family; the habitual abode of one’s family.”210 In turn, it defined
“establish” as “[t]o originate and secure the permanent existence of;
to found; . . . to create and regulate.”211 Combined, these terms connote securing and occupying a long-term dwelling.212
The phrase occasionally appeared in judicial decisions before
Meyer was decided, though not as a term of art. One line of cases
involved charitable gifts. For instance, in Peek v. Woman’s Home Missionary Society,213 the Illinois Supreme Court referred to a bequest
that was intended to “establish a home” for orphans.214 Board of
Commissioners v. Dinwiddie215 involved a devise of land “to establish
a home for the benefit of worthy persons who have no home.”216 Another example is Chase v. Stockett, 217 where the decedent created a
trust to “establish a home for ‘destitute, aged, and infirm women.’”218
As used in these decisions, the phrase “establish a home” connoted
acquiring a physical dwelling and operating it as a long-term
residence.
A second line of cases concerned homestead claims. In the same
year that Meyer was decided, the Eighth Circuit observed in United
States v. Bennett219 that the law required a claimant to “prove that he
had a habitable home upon the land and had actually resided upon
and cultivated the same for the term of five . . . years”;220 it noted that
“there must be good faith on the part of the homesteader to establish
a home for himself and family upon the land.”221 Similarly, in Tustin v.
Adams,222 the court explained that the homestead laws required the
210 Home, WEBSTER’S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1913), https://www.websters
1913.com/words/Home [https://perma.cc/2ZJE-8BRF]. Earlier editions reflect the same meaning.
See, e.g., Home, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) (defining
“home” as “[a] dwelling house; the house or place in which one resides”).
211 Establish, WEBSTER’S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (1913), https://www.websters1913.com/words/Establish [https://perma.cc/7MN3-JSYN].
212 Homestead, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1891) is also helpful. It defines “homestead” as “the home, the house and the adjoining land, where the head of the family dwells; the
home farm. The fixed residence of the head of a family, with the land and buildings surrounding
the main house.” Id. (citation omitted).
213 136 N.E. 772 (Ill. 1922).
214 Id. at 775.
215 37 N.E. 795 (Ind. 1894).
216 Id. at 796.
217 19 A. 761 (Md. 1890).
218 Id. at 762.
219 296 F. 409 (8th Cir. 1923).
220 Id. at 411.
221 Id. at 413.
222 87 F. 377 (D. Wash 1898).
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claimant to enter vacant public land and “establish a home thereon,
by either erecting a dwelling house, or purchasing from the owner a
house suitable for habitation.”223 In both instances, the phrase meant
acquiring a house or similar structure and using it as a long-term
residence.
Finally, two later Supreme Court uses of the phrase support this
interpretation.224 In Shelley v. Kraemer,225 the Court described a segregation-era zoning ordinance at issue in a prior case; it explained that
the law “forbade any Negro to establish a home on any property in a
white community.”226 In addition, concurring in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,227 Justice Marshall observed that for
adults with intellectual disabilities, the “right to ‘establish a
home’ . . . means living together in group homes, for . . . group homes
have become the primary means by which [they] can enter life in the
community.”228 Again, in these cases, “home” connotes a physical
structure that is acquired and used as a long-term residence.
In sum, as the First Circuit explained in González-Fuentes v.
Molina,229 the “constitutionally protected prerogative to ‘establish a
home’” encompasses the right “to reside in a dwelling of [one’s] own
choosing.”230 This right logically covers both leasing and purchasing a
home. When Meyer was decided, about 45% of Americans owned
their homes, while the remainder were renters.231 It was therefore
common for people to “establish” homes in both contexts, and nothing in the opinion suggests that the right was limited to one method of
acquisition.
223

Id. at 378.

A number of decisions by lower courts have also used the phrase in this manner. See
infra notes 279–81.
224

225

334 U.S. 1 (1948).

226

Id. at 12.

227

473 U.S. 432 (1985).

228

Id. at 461.

229

607 F.3d 864 (1st Cir. 2010).

Id. at 890 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)) (commenting that
while an electronic supervision program confined prisoners to their homes, it allowed them to
“live with their loved ones, form relationships with neighbors, lay down roots in their community, and reside in a dwelling of their own choosing . . . rather than in a cell designated by the
government” and that what it “afforded the appellees was included in the constitutionally protected prerogative ‘to establish a home’ ”).
230

231 See Housing 1929–1941, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclopedia.com/education/
news-and-education-magazines/housing-1929-1941 [https://perma.cc/5WHS-M3JA] (indicating
45.6% of Americans owned their homes when the 1920 census was taken).
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C. Evolution of the Right after Meyer
Over 440 federal and state decisions have quoted the Meyer
phrase “right . . . to . . . establish a home” since the case was decided.232 More than 120 opinions have quoted this language in the last
decade.233 The right occasionally appears alone234 but is usually
grouped with other Meyer rights, sometimes as part of the full list.235 It
is frequently seen in the original cluster “right to ‘marry, establish a
home and bring up children’”236 and often combined with the right to
raise children.237 Despite this clustering, it is clear that these are three
separate rights.238
Three years after Meyer, a divided Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of comprehensive zoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. under the rational basis test.239 Although the decision
shocked observers who assumed that the Court would reject comprehensive land use regulation as an attack on property rights, scholars

232 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Cases were identified by searching the
“Cases” database in Westlaw on February 21, 2021 using the following search terms: “establish a
home” /50 meyer. This search identified 443 federal and state decisions.
233 Id. The same search indicated that 127 of these decisions were rendered after February
21, 2011.
234 See, e.g., González-Fuentes, 607 F.3d at 890.
235 See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting the entire Meyer list
with approval); Perrier-Bilbo v. United States, 954 F.3d 413, 434 (1st Cir. 2020) (defining the
scope of protected “liberty” under the Due Process Clause by quoting from the Roth Court’s
quotation of the Meyer list).
236 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 668 (2015).
237 See, e.g., In re B.F., 976 N.E.2d 65, 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
238 For example, in Obergefell, the Court made it clear that the right to marry is not tied to
having children: “[I]t cannot be said the Court or the States have conditioned the right to marry
on the capacity or commitment to procreate.” Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 669. Similarly, unmarried
individuals have the right to bring up their children. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649
(1972). Finally, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), Justice
Marshall recognized that the right to establish a home was not tied to marriage or children, but
rather could be exercised by single adults; he noted that “[f]or [adults with intellectual disabilities], this right means living together in group homes.” Id. at 461 (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also Cabrol v. Town of Youngsville, 106 F.3d 101,
107 (5th Cir. 1997) (referring to Due Process Clause protection for “an individual’s freedom . . . to establish a home”).
239 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395–97 (1926).
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suggest that it was largely motivated by racial and ethnic bias.240 Notably, the decision did not mention the right to establish a home.241
Two factors explain this omission. First, because the plaintiff was
attacking Euclid’s decision to zone a portion of its land for residential
use rather than industrial use, it had no incentive to invoke the
right.242 Second, the ordinance had only a minor impact on the right.
For example, it permitted multifamily housing in five of the six use
districts,243 and the minimum lot sizes for single-family homes ranged
from 700 to 5,000 square feet—small by modern standards.244 Significantly, the Euclid Court anticipated that future cases might involve
ordinances that were more restrictive; it indicated that a higher standard of review could be appropriate “where the general public interest would so far outweigh the interest of the municipality that the
municipality would not be allowed to stand in the way.”245
In the decades after Euclid, the Court generally refused to review
cases that challenged zoning ordinances.246 But it did issue three wellknown decisions that touch on the right to establish a home in the
zoning context: Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas (1974),247 Moore v.
City of East Cleveland (1977),248 and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985).249 In two of these cases, the parties failed to
raise the issue, so it was not directly before the Court.
The Belle Terre ordinance permitted only one type of residential
use, “one-family dwellings”; it defined “family” as “one or more per240 See WOLF, supra note 203, at 138–42; see also Richard H. Chused, Euclid’s Historical
Imagery, 51 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 597, 604–15 (2001). For example, duplexes and apartment
buildings were barred from the U-1 district, which consisted only of detached single-family
houses, resulting in economic segregation. See, e.g., Euclid, 272 U.S. at 380. The Court’s infamous characterization of an apartment house as “a mere parasite” reflects this animus. See id. at
394. As the trial judge remarked: “In the last analysis, the result to be accomplished is to classify
the population and segregate them according to their income or situation in life.” Ambler Realty
Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924).
241 Euclid, 272 U.S. 365. Justice McReynolds dissented, without explaining why. Id. at 397.
242 See id. at 382 (explaining that part of the Ambler Realty land “falls in class U-2” where
the main permitted uses were detached single-family homes and duplexes).
243 Id. at 380–81.
244 Id. at 381–82.
245 Id. at 390.
246 But see Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 117, 121, 123
(1928) (citing Meyer in a zoning dispute about a proposed “philanthropic home for aged poor,”
but finding it unnecessary to decide whether “it is within the power of the State or municipality
by a general zoning law to exclude the proposed new home from a district”).
247 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
248 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
249 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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sons related by blood, adoption, or marriage.”250 The case arose when
a couple leased their house to a university student, and five more students later moved in as well.251 In response to the village’s lawsuit, the
owners and tenants asserted that the ordinance was unconstitutional.252 The defendants might have challenged the ordinance as a
violation of the right to establish a home because it prohibited the
tenants from living together in the village.253 Instead, they argued that
the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause based on a variety
of arguments, including the right to privacy, the right to travel, and the
claim that the tenants’ marital status should be irrelevant.254 The majority characterized the case as a garden-variety zoning dispute that
did not involve a fundamental right255 and upheld the ordinance under
the rational basis test.256 In his dissent, Justice Marshall reasoned that
the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause by unduly burdening the tenants’ rights of association and privacy.257 He buttressed this
argument by citing Meyer for the proposition that “[t]he right to ‘establish a home’ is an essential part of the liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”258
Yet three years later, in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the
Court held that a parallel ordinance violated the Due Process
Clause.259 The ordinance restricted occupancy of a dwelling to one
family, yet defined “family” more narrowly than the Belle Terre law.260
As a result, the homeowner, her son, and one of her grandsons could
live in the home, but a second grandson could not.261 The majority
distinguished Belle Terre on the basis that it only involved unrelated
250 Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 1–2. The ordinance also classified two unrelated persons as a
“family.” Id.
251 See id. at 2–3.
252 See id.
253 The brief filed on behalf of the tenants and owners did not raise the right to establish a
home. Brief for Appellees, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (No. 73-191), 1974
WL 187429.
254 Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 7.
255 See id.
256 See id. at 3, 10.
257 Id. at 15 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall seemed to view the ordinance as a form of
exclusionary zoning. He observed that some lower federal courts had “acted to insure that landuse controls are not used as means of confining minorities and the poor to the ghettos of our
central cities.” Id. at 14. His dissent cited two early articles on exclusionary zoning. See id. at 14
n.3.
258 Id. at 15.
259 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland,431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977).
260 See id. at 531–33.
261 The property at issue was a “frame house” owned by Moore that contained two “dwelling units.” Moore and her family occupied one of the units. Id. at 533.
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individuals, while the Moore ordinance “slic[ed] deeply into the family
itself” by regulating which relatives could live in a home.262 The Court
explained that “[a] host of cases, tracing their lineage to Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters have consistently acknowledged
a ‘private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.’”263 Reasoning that the rational basis test was inappropriate “when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements,”
the Court used a higher level of scrutiny by examining “the importance of the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which
they are served by the challenged regulation.”264 Although it noted
that the city’s justifications for the ordinance—concern for overcrowding, traffic, parking, and school financing—were “legitimate,” the
Court concluded that the ordinance served them “marginally, at
best.”265
The Moore plurality did not expressly rely on the right to establish a home, even though Moore raised the issue.266 But the opinion
was permeated with references to the importance of the family home:
the traditions that “uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents
[share] a household along with parents and children”;267 “close relatives . . . draw together and participate in the duties and the satisfactions of a common home”;268 and “the broader family has tended to
come together for mutual sustenance and to maintain or rebuild a secure home life.”269
In sum, Moore recognized the right of a family to live together in
a home—an amalgam of the Meyer rights to establish a home and to
raise children. The Court touched on this theme by quoting from a
famous dissent by Justice Harlan:
[H]ere we have not an intrusion into the home so much as on
the life which characteristically has its place in the
Id. at 498.
Id. at 499 (citations omitted).
264 Id.
265 Id. at 499–500.
266 See Brief for Appellant at 31, Moore, 431 U.S. 494 (No. 75-6289), 1976 WL 178722.
Moore’s brief relied, in part, on the right to establish a home: “By arbitrarily ruling out certain
groupings of blood-related family members, the City of East Cleveland has substantially interfered with the right of the Appellant and her children and grandchildren to, as enunciated in
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), ‘establish a home and bring up children.’ ” Id.
267 Moore, 431 U.S. at 504.
268 Id. at 505.
269 Id. In his dissent, Justice White quoted the Meyer list of due process liberties, including
the “right . . . [to] establish a home,” and noted that “Meyer has not been overruled nor its
definition of liberty rejected.” Id. at 545 (White, J., dissenting).
262
263
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home. . . . The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of
family life. And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has been found to draw to its protection the
principles of more than one explicitly granted Constitutional
right.270
Eight years later in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc., the Court reviewed the city’s denial of an application for a special use permit to operate a group home for people with intellectual
disabilities.271 The applicant might have relied on the right to establish
a home but failed to raise this claim.272 Instead it argued that intellectual disability was a quasi-suspect classification and, accordingly, that
the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause.273 The majority
rejected the argument that intellectual disability constituted a quasisuspect classification.274 However, the Court concluded that the ordinance was invalid as applied under the rational basis test because it
would subject residents to “closely supervised and highly regulated
conditions.”275 Yet scholars suggest that the Court actually utilized a
form of heightened scrutiny.276
Concurring with the result, Justice Marshall and two colleagues
focused on the right to establish a home. They explained that “the
interest . . . in establishing group homes is substantial” because “[t]he
right to ‘establish a home’ has long been cherished as one of the fundamental liberties embraced by the Due Process Clause.”277 As such,
they reasoned that heightened scrutiny was appropriate “[w]ith respect to a liberty so valued as the right to establish a home in the
community, and so likely to be denied on the basis of irrational fears
and outright hostility.”278
270 Id. at 504 n.12 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551–52 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
271 See 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
272 The brief filed on behalf of the applicant did not mention the right to establish a home.
See Brief for Respondents, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)
(No. 84-468), 1985 WL 669785. A footnote asserted that shelter was a “basic societal benefit[],”
but cited no authority for this proposition. See id. at 42 n.17.
273 See id. at 25–36.
274 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445–46.
275 See id. at 450.
276 See, e.g., John M. Payne, From the Courts: A New Constitutional Look in Zoning Ordinances, 14 REAL EST. L.J. 260, 263 (1986) (noting that the majority’s analysis used “heightened
scrutiny in some degree”).
277 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
278 Id. at 473.
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Lower courts have also discussed the right to establish a home in
contexts related to land use. For example, in Vasquez v. Foxx,279 the
Seventh Circuit held that the right was not infringed by a state statute
that barred sex offenders from living within 500 feet of a child-related
use because they were free to live elsewhere in the state.280 And the
First Circuit relied on the right in González-Fuentes v. Molina, in part,
to reject a due process challenge to the procedures governing a program by which prisoners were released from custody and allowed to
live at home, subject to electronic monitoring—because it protected
the “prerogative to ‘establish a home.’”281
Outside of the land use context, the Court has cited the right to
establish a home—along with the rights to marry and to raise children—in a series of major decisions involving family life. The common
theme in these decisions is the existence of a “private realm of family
life which the state cannot enter.”282 In this setting, the right to establish a home plays a supplemental role, but it helps to demarcate the
extent to which the state may intrude into the family, as it did in
Moore. For example, as Justice Goldberg observed in Griswold v.
Connecticut, which invalidated laws forbidding the use of
contraceptives:
The Connecticut statutes here involved deal with a particularly important and sensitive area of privacy—that of the
marital relation and the marital home. This Court recognized
in Meyer v. Nebraska . . . that the right “to marry, establish a
home and bring up children” was an essential part of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.283
The right to establish a home was also mentioned in either the Court’s
opinion or a concurrence in the following cases: Roe v. Wade284 (right
895 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 525; see also Belt v. State, 127 S.W.3d 277, 284 (Tex. App. 2004) (finding a probation condition requiring a sex offender to reside more than 1,000 feet away from schools and
other child-related uses did not violate his right to establish a home).
281 607 F.3d 864, 890 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
It observed that the program allowed prisoners to “live with their loved ones . . . and reside in a
dwelling of their own choosing,” which were “included in the constitutionally protected prerogative ‘to establish a home.’ ” Id. (quoting Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399); see also Deraffele v. City of
Williamsport, No. 4:14-CV-01849, 2015 WL 5781409, at * 13, *16 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 19, 2015) (finding ordinance requiring that the tenant’s family members be listed on the lease did not violate
the “fundamental right to establish a home” because it only imposed a “slight burden”).
282 See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 447, 452 (1990) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
283 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399).
284 410 U.S. 113, 214 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
279
280
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to abortion), Runyon v. McCrary285 (right to education), Zablocki v.
Redhail286 (right to marry), Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists287 (right to abortion), Hodgson v. Minnesota288 (right to abortion), and Troxel v. Granville289 (right to raise
children).290 Most recently, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court characterized the “right to ‘marry, establish a home and bring up children’”
as “a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause.”291
IV.

CONTOURS

OF THE

RIGHT

TO

ESTABLISH

A

HOME

A. A Fundamental Right
As a general rule, a law that infringes a fundamental right will
survive a substantive due process challenge only if it satisfies the strict
scrutiny test.292 The Supreme Court has designated a number of liberties as fundamental rights, including the rights to marry, raise children,
travel, and vote.293 This Part demonstrates that the right to establish a
home should also be recognized as a fundamental right.
The Supreme Court has never squarely decided whether this right
is fundamental.294 Although Meyer v. Nebraska referred to its cata427 U.S. 160, 176–79 (1976).
434 U.S. 374, 384, 386–87 (1978).
287 476 U.S. 747, 773, 775–76 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring), overruled by Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
288 497 U.S. 417, 435 (1990).
289 530 U.S. 57, 65–67 (2000).
290 Although courts often mention the right to establish a home, scholars have overlooked
it. A few articles briefly refer to the right, but none analyzes its history, nature, or scope. See,
e.g., Meris Bergquist, No Exit for Patients Confined at the Vermont State Hospital, 32 VT. BAR J.
34, 34 (2006) (two sentences); Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for
the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 111, 136 (1987) (one sentence); Inez Smith Reid, Law, Politics and the Homeless, 89 W.
VA. L. REV. 115, 144 (1986) (two paragraphs).
291 Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644, 668 (quoting Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384).
292 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 102, at 814 (presenting a framework for determining
whether a fundamental right exists and thus will need to meet strict scrutiny); see also Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1292–96 (2007) (discussing the
Court’s “evolving approach” to protecting fundamental rights from government intrusion by
applying strict scrutiny); Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 862–66 (2006) (“Overall, the
strict scrutiny survival rate in fundamental rights cases is 24 percent, with 11 of 46 applications
upholding the challenged laws.”).
293 See Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644 (right to marry); Troxel, 530 U.S. 57 (right to raise children); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (right to travel); Kramer v. Union Free Sch.
Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (right to vote).
294 In Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), the Court held that the Constitution does not
create a positive right to housing—that is, the state is not obligated to provide housing to those in
285
286

R
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logue of liberties—including the right to establish a home—as “fundamental rights which must be respected,”295 this usage predates the
Court’s modern jurisprudence.296 A number of contemporary federal
and state decisions have characterized the right as “fundamental,”297
but this is an overbroad reading of Meyer. However, the Court did
recognize an analogous fundamental right in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland—the right of a family to live together in a home.298
The Court’s approach to identifying fundamental rights has varied over time.299 In Washington v. Glucksberg, it utilized a rigid twopart framework.300 More recently, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court
adopted a flexible standard, strongly suggesting that the Glucksberg
test was no longer appropriate.301 The analysis below evaluates the
right to establish a home under both approaches and then discusses
the appropriate standard of review.

need. Id. at 73–74. It rejected claims that the “need for decent shelter” and the “right to retain
peaceful possession of one’s home” were “fundamental interests,” commenting that “the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill.” Id. The right to
establish a home, in contrast, is a negative right.
295

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923).

However, Justice Kennedy expressed the view that “[t]he broad formulation of fundamental rights announced in Meyer is one of the richest in all of our case law.” FRANK J.
COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY’S JURISPRUDENCE 22 (2009) (quoting Anthony M. Kennedy,
Unenumerated Rights and the Dictates of Judicial Restraint, Address at the Canadian Institute
for Advanced Legal Studies (July 24–Aug. 1, 1986)).
296

297 See, e.g., Sebesta v. Davis, 878 F.3d 226, 232 (7th Cir. 2017) (“fundamental liberty interest[]”); Henderson v. Adams, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1077 (S.D. Ind. 2016) (same); In re Visitation
of A.A.L., 927 N.W.2d 486, 492 (Wis. 2019) (“fundamental liberty”); N.J. Div. of Child Prot. &
Permanency v. A.B., 175 A.3d 942, 948 (N.J. 2017) (“fundamental right”).
298 In Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997), the Court described the
source of its “established method of substantive-due-process analysis” by quoting from Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion). It stated: “[W]e have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’ ” Glucksberg,
521 U.S. at 720–21 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503). The implication is that the right recognized
in Moore is deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition, and hence a fundamental right.
See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 102, at 826 (concluding that Moore recognized a fundamental
right “to keep the family together”).
299 See generally Robert C. Farrell, An Excess of Methods: Identifying Implied Fundamental
Rights in the Supreme Court, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 203, 216–48 (2007) (discussing different approaches).
300

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21.

301

See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 663–71 (2015).

R
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B. Obergefell Approach
1. Overview
Obergefell established the Court’s modern standard for identifying fundamental rights.302 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy
observed that the process is not governed by “any formula” but rather
requires courts to “exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests
of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect.”303 He explained:
That process is guided by many of the same considerations
relevant to analysis of other constitutional provisions that set
forth broad principles rather than specific requirements. History and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not
set its outer boundaries. That method respects our history
and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the
present.304
Kennedy began his analysis by stressing that “the Court has long
held the right to marry is protected by the Constitution.”305 He cited a
number of Supreme Court precedents for the proposition that “the
right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause”306—including Meyer—though none of those decisions expressly characterize
it as a “fundamental right”; rather, they broadly discuss the importance of marriage.
Kennedy then identified “four principles and traditions
[that] . . . demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under
the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples”307 as follows: (1) “the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent
in the concept of individual autonomy”;308 (2) “the right to marry is
fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other
in its importance to the committed individuals”;309 (3) “the right to
302 See id. As the Court noted, the Obergefell approach is rooted in Justice Harlan’s famous
dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Obergefell, 576 U.S. at
663–64.
303 Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 664.
304 Id. (citation omitted).
305 Id.
306 Id. at 664–65. Kennedy included Meyer in this list, citing to the page that contains the
standard list of due process liberties, including the rights “to marry, establish a home and bring
up children.” Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). If taken literally, this
reference suggests the Court has already found the right to establish a home to be fundamental.
307 Id. at 665.
308 Id.
309 Id. at 666.
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marry . . . safeguards children and families”;310 and (4) “marriage is a
keystone of our social order.”311 In parallel fashion, the analysis below
demonstrates that the right to establish a home is a fundamental right
under the Obergefell standard.312
2. Constitutional Protection of the Right to Establish a Home
Like the right to marry, the Court has long held that the right to
establish a home is protected by the Constitution.313 Kennedy’s citation to Meyer as the temporal foundation of the right to marry applies
equally to the right to establish a home because both appear in the
Meyer catalogue of liberties.
The Court has recognized the importance of the right to establish
a home—though less frequently than the right to marry. For example,
Meyer classified the right as one of the “privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men.”314 In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., Justice
Marshall observed that the right “has long been cherished as one of
the fundamental liberties” protected by the Due Process Clause.315
And in Obergefell, the Court quoted Zablocki v. Redhail in describing
the right—together with the right to marry and the right to bring up
children—as a “central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”316 Notably, both the right to marry and the right to raise
children are already recognized as fundamental rights.317
310

Id. at 667.

311

Id. at 669.

Before Obergefell, the Court only recognized negative fundamental rights. As Justice
Thomas’s dissent commented: “In the American legal tradition, liberty has long been understood
as individual freedom from governmental action, not as a right to a particular governmental
entitlement.” Id. at 726 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But Obergefell held that government must recognize marriages of same-sex couples, indicating that the fundamental right to marry was a positive right. Id. at 675–76 (majority opinion). An argument could be made that the right to
establish a home should be a positive right—obligating the government to provide housing for
those in need. But this would require far more affirmative government action than recognition of
marriage, and thus it is not clear that the argument would succeed. Accordingly, this Article
argues for recognition of the right to establish a home as a negative fundamental right.
312

313

See supra Part III.

314

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 461 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
315

316

See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 668 (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978)).

See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 675 (right to marry); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66
(2000) (right to raise children).
317
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3. “Principles and Traditions” Supporting the Right
American law has long recognized the right to establish a home,
as discussed in Parts II and III. As Justice Kennedy acknowledged,
this history is important in identifying a fundamental right, though not
determinative.318 Using the Obergefell framework, the analysis below
discusses four principles and traditions that explain why the right to
establish a home is fundamental: (1) the home is a necessity for existence; (2) the home provides security against the state and the outside
world; (3) the home protects individual liberty; and (4) the home is
the center of family life.319
a. Home as a Necessity
Shelter is a necessity for human existence—like food or water.320
Without shelter, a person exposed to the ravages of inclement weather
and other hazards cannot survive.321 Thus, humans have utilized shelter for at least 350,000 years.322 As Professor Jerry Moore observes,
“[w]e have been building homes longer than we have been Homo sapiens.”323 Blackstone invoked this ancient history when he posited that
even in the state of nature before governments existed, each person
enjoyed a “right of habitation.”324
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of shelter
in a number of decisions. For example, in Shapiro v. Thompson,325 it
described “the very means to subsist” as “food, shelter, and other necessities of life.”326 In other decisions, the Court has referred to “shelObergefell, 576 U.S. at 664.
These principles and traditions differ somewhat from those considered in Obergefell
because the nature of the right is different. The Obergefell Court emphasized that the process for
identifying fundamental rights “has not been reduced to any formula.” Id. at 663–64 (quoting
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Nothing in the decision indicates that the identification of all fundamental rights must be based on the principles and traditions relevant to the right to marry.
320 See FOX, supra note 26, at 7.
321 The most basic function of a home is “providing shelter from natural elements.” JERRY
D. MOORE, THE PREHISTORY OF HOME 3 (2012). In particular, the shelter of a home allows
humans to minimize the loss of heat, which is crucial for survival in many climates. See id. at 45;
see also MARY GORDON, HOME: WHAT IT MEANS AND WHY IT MATTERS 38 (2010) (“We are, as
a species, terrifyingly fragile, ill-equipped for what nature provides in the way of dangers: cold,
heat, storm, predatory beasts . . . .”).
322 See MOORE, supra note 321, at 93 (“[T]he oldest dwelling currently known is about
450,000–350,000 years old.”).
323 Id. at 5.
324 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 63, at *223.
325 394 U.S. 618 (1969), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
326 Id. at 627.
318
319

R

R
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ter, fuel, and other basic necessities”327 and “housing and the other
necessities of life.”328 Given modern health and safety regulations and
building codes, the only legally acceptable form of permanent shelter
is a house, apartment, or other permanent dwelling—in short, a home.
The plight of the homeless helps to demonstrate the necessity for
shelter. One study revealed that unsheltered homeless adults in Boston were almost three times more likely to die than those sleeping in
shelters.329 Although the mortality rate for the unsheltered is certainly
affected by factors that contribute to homelessness in the first place,330
it is also increased by conditions that they experience. As another
study explained, certain mortality factors arise from “homelessness itself, such as . . . exposure to communicable diseases, [and] harsh living
environments.”331 For example, the rates of hepatitis and tuberculosis
for homeless people are far higher than for the general population.332
Similarly, hypothermia caused by exposure to cold disproportionately
affects the homeless, leading to an increased risk of death.333
b. Home as a Sanctuary
For centuries, the Anglo-American legal tradition has valued the
home as a sanctuary from other people and from the state.334 Indeed,
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 531 n.2 (1974).
Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 279 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
329 See Jill S. Roncarati, Travis P. Baggett, James J. O’Connell, Stephen W. Hwang, E.
Francis Cook, Nancy Krieger & Glorian Sorensen, Mortality Among Unsheltered Homeless
Adults in Boston, Massachusetts, 2000–2009, 178 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1242 (2018), https://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6142967/ [https://perma.cc/99WR-FXNC]; see also
Jonathan R. Hibbs, Lawrence Benner, Lawrence Klugman, Robert Spencer, Irene Macchia,
Anne K. Mellinger & Daniel Fife, Mortality in a Cohort of Homeless Adults in Philadelphia, 331
NEW ENG. J. MED. 304, 304 (1994) (“The age-adjusted mortality rate among the homeless was
3.5 times that of Philadelphia’s general population . . . .”).
330 Mental health and substance abuse problems, for example, contribute both to the risk of
homelessness and the higher mortality rate. See Seena Fazel, John R. Geddes & Margot Kushel,
The Health of Homeless People in High-Income Countries: Descriptive Epidemiology, Health
Consequences, and Clinical and Policy Recommendations, 384 LANCET 1529 (2014).
331 Id. at 1532 (footnotes omitted); see also Housing and Homelessness as a Public Health
Issue, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N (Nov. 7, 2017), https://apha.org/policies-and-advocacy/publichealth-policy-statements/policy-database/2018/01/18/housing-and-homelessness-as-a-publichealth-issue [https://perma.cc/MRH7-2XLC] (discussing public health impacts of homelessness).
332 Fazel et al., supra note 330, at 1532–33.
333 See Jerzy Romaszko, Iwona Cymes, Ewa Draganska, Robert Kuchta & Katarzyna Glinska-Lewczuk, Mortality Among the Homeless: Causes and Meteorological Relationships, PLOS
ONE (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5739436/ [https://perma.cc/535LHHJV] (“Deaths due to hypothermia were thirteen-fold more frequent among the homeless as
compared to the general population.”).
334 See supra text accompanying notes 39–45; see also Barros, supra note 30, at 260–69
327
328
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for millennia cultures around the world have used the home to provide security against outside intrusions.335
At the most basic level, a home protects its inhabitants against
physical attack. For example, one analysis concluded that homeless
women are between two and four times more likely to experience sexual assault and other violent attacks than women in general.336 It concluded that the “best ‘defense’ against the risks of victimization that
result from being homeless is—to not be homeless!”337 When a criminal intrusion into the home does occur, the castle doctrine traditionally allows the resident to defend herself with force.338
The home also serves as a haven from the outside world in a
more general sense. In Carey v. Brown,339 Justice Black acknowledged
the importance of this function:
Preserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which
men and women can repair to escape from the tribulations of
their daily pursuits, is surely an important value. Our decisions reflect no lack of solicitude for the right of an individual “to be let alone” in the privacy of the home, “sometimes
the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick.”340
Anthropologist John Allen similarly views the home as “the place
where our minds and bodies recover from the challenges we face in
the outside world.”341 He explains that the “human need to feel at
home has its roots in our evolutionary biology and is reinforced today

(discussing security in the home); Dickinson, supra note 25, at 1113–16 (discussing Fourth
Amendment protection).

R

335 See, e.g., BILL BRYSON, AT HOME: A SHORT HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE 29–30 (2010)
(noting that 5,000 years ago the houses in Skara Brae, a small village, “had locking doors”).
336 JANA L. JASINSKI, JENNIFER K. WESELY, ELIZABETH MUSTAINE & JAMES D. WRIGHT,
THE EXPERIENCE OF VIOLENCE IN THE LIVES OF HOMELESS WOMEN: A RESEARCH REPORT 2
(2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/211976.pdf [https://perma.cc/2256-NE4Q]. The
most common types of injuries beyond the category of sexual assaults were “bruises, black eyes,
and broken bones.” Id. at 83. The location where homeless women sleep at night plays a major
role in their safety. See id. at 53; see also Fazel et al., supra note 330, at 1535 (“[S]tudies show that
between 27% and 52% of homeless individuals were physically or sexually assaulted in the previous year.”).
337

JASINSKI

338

See, e.g., People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914).

ET AL.,

supra note 336, at 53.

339

447 U.S. 455 (1980).

R

R

Id. at 471 (quoting Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J.,
concurring)).
340

341

ALLEN, supra note 26, at 30.

R
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by our cognitive psychology.”342 As such, Allen concludes that a home
is “necessary to maintain equilibrium in our lives.”343
Finally, the home provides security against action by the state.
The Fourth Amendment commands that “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their . . . houses . . . shall not be violated.”344 In Silverman
v. United States,345 the Supreme Court explained that “[a]t the very
core [of the amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”346 As Justice Kennedy later noted in Minnesota v. Carter,347
“[t]he axiom that a man’s home is his castle . . . has acquired over time
a power and an independent significance justifying a more general assurance of personal security in one’s home, an assurance which has
become part of our constitutional tradition.”348
c. Home as the Locus of Liberty
One of the principles and traditions that Justice Kennedy relied
on in Obergefell was “the right to personal choice regarding marriage
[which] is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.”349 He
stressed the “abiding connection between marriage and liberty.”350
Similarly, our American tradition recognizes that the home is closely
linked to liberty.351
As the Supreme Court summarized in City of Ladue v. Gilleo,352
“[a] special respect for individual liberty in the home has long been
part of our culture and our law.”353 The Court has consistently held
that the exercise of constitutional rights inside the privacy of one’s
home is entitled to greater protection than outside the home.354 Judicial interpretation of the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Id. at 9.
Id. at 30.
344 U.S. CONST. amend. IV, cl. 1.
345 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
346 Id. at 511.
347 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
348 Id. at 100 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
349 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 665 (2015).
350 Id.
351 See supra text accompanying notes 46–51; see also Barros, supra note 30, at 269–75
(discussing privacy in the home); John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783, 786–87 (2006) (discussing standards in federal constitutional law that
center on the privacy of the home).
352 512 U.S. 43 (1994).
353 Id. at 58.
354 See supra text accompanying notes 47, 98–102.
342
343
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Amendments has created “home-centric jurisprudence.”355 Thus, having a home is necessary for a person to enjoy the full extent of the
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution.
For example, in Stanley v. Georgia, the Court invalidated a statute that criminalized the possession of obscene material “in the privacy of a person’s own home,” stressing the “fundamental” nature of
“the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.”356 It commented:
“If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he
may read or what films he may watch.”357 In District of Columbia v.
Heller,358 it expanded the scope of the Second Amendment to allow
possession of firearms in the home; it stressed that “the home [is]
where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most
acute.”359 Similarly, in Lawrence v. Texas,360 the Court reasoned that
the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause allowed adults to
engage in “homosexual conduct” in “the confines of their homes.”361
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy opined: “In our tradition the
State is not omnipresent in the home.”362
More broadly, in Carey v. Brown, the Court explained that “[t]he
State’s interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of
the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.”363 And in United States Department of Defense v. Federal Labor
Relations Authority,364 it stated that “the privacy of the home . . . is
accorded special consideration in our Constitution, laws, and
traditions.”365
d. Home as the Center of Family Life
American law has traditionally viewed the home as the center of
family life—a “sacred retreat to which families repair for their privacy
355

See Dickinson, supra note 25, at 1109–16.

356

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).

357

Id. at 565.

358

554 U.S. 570 (2008).

359

See id. at 628.

360

539 U.S. 558 (2003).

361

See id. at 567–68.

362

Id. at 562.

363

Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980).
510 U.S. 487 (1994).
Id. at 501.

364
365
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and their daily way of living.”366 Indeed, the home has been the center
of family life since prehistoric times, long before governments arose.367
In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy explained that one basis for protecting the right to marry was that it “safeguards children and families
and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.”368 He observed: “The Court has recognized these
connections by describing the varied rights as a unified whole: ‘[T]he
right to “marry, establish a home and bring up children” is a central
part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.’”369 Thus, the
right to establish a home is closely linked to the rights to marry and to
bring up children. The family life that Obergefell celebrates can only
occur in a home, as the Court acknowledged by stressing the importance of “loving and nurturing homes” for children.370
Obergefell also recognized that “permanency and stability” are
important to “children’s best interests.”371 The secure family relationships that are “so critical to a child’s cognitive, emotional, social, and
psychological development”372 are developed and maintained in a
home.373 Housing insecurity “has devastating effects on children,”
which can include delayed speech and language development, hyperactivity, and psychiatric, behavioral, and academic problems.374
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,375 the Court addressed another key aspect of the family home: “Family relationships, by their
366 Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring). Sociologists
suggest “the link between home and family is so strong that the terms are almost interchangeable.” Shelley Mallett, Understanding Home: A Critical Review of the Literature, 52 SOCIO. REV.
62, 73 (2004); see also Hareven, supra note 165, at 228 (noting that “[t]he close identification of
home with family” can be “traced to the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century”).
367 Anthropologist John Allen observes that although “[f]amilies leave little evidence in the
archaeological record . . . [t]he study of family dynamics across species makes clear that the
origins of home are likely tied to family.” ALLEN, supra note 26, at 108. Some scholars argue that
the importance of the home for early humans “originates from two biological imperatives: reproductive success and the extended dependency of human offspring.” See MOORE, supra note 321,
at 22. Under this view, “it is to the reproductive advantage of both parents to have their offspring in a relatively safe location to which resources are transported.” Id.
368 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 667 (2015).
369 Id. at 668 (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978)).
370 See id. at 668.
371 Id.
372 See Joseph S. Jackson & Lauren G. Fasig, The Parentless Child’s Right to a Permanent
Family, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 28 (2011).
373 See Lindsay T. Graham, Samuel D. Gosling & Christopher K. Travis, The Psychology of
Home Environments: A Call for Research on Residential Space, 10 PERSPS. ON PSYCH. SCI. 346,
347–48 (2015) (discussing the role of the home in early social and cognitive development).
374 See ALLEN, supra note 26, at 191–92.
375 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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nature, involve deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily
few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.”376 The home is also the place where the
ideals and beliefs of children are formed. As the Court noted in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, “[i]t is through the family that we
inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral
and cultural.”377
Finally, as the Court summarized in Hodgson v. Minnesota: “The
home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life. And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has been found
to draw to its protection the principles of more than one explicitly
granted Constitutional right.”378
4. Conclusion
In sum, within the Obergefell framework, the right to a home is
such a “fundamental” interest that “the State must accord . . . [it] . . . respect.”379 It is arguably more fundamental, for example, than the right to marry or the right to travel, which are already
recognized as fundamental rights.
C. Glucksberg Approach
1. Overview
Before Obergefell was decided, the generally accepted test for
identifying fundamental rights was the approach developed in Washington v. Glucksberg.380 There the Court employed a two-part inquiry
in refusing to find that the right to a physician’s assistance in committing suicide was a fundamental right:
First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process
Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition,” and “implicit in the concept of or376 Id. at 619–20; see also Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505 (1977) (noting
the tradition that close relatives often “draw together and participate in the duties and the satisfactions of a common home” and “maintain or rebuild a secure home life”).
377 Moore, 431 U.S. at 503–04; see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618–19 (observing that “highly
personal relationships” such as family ties “foster diversity and act as critical buffers between the
individual and the power of the State”).
378 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 448 n.33 (1990) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 551–52 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
379 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 664 (2015).
380 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), superseded by Obergefell, 576 U.S. 644.
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dered liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would
exist if they were sacrificed.” Second, we have required in
substantive-due-process cases a “careful description” of the
asserted fundamental liberty interest.381
In utilizing a different standard, the Obergefell Court explained that
although the Glucksberg approach “may have been appropriate for
the asserted right there involved . . . it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy.”382
The relationship between the Obergefell and Glucksberg approaches remains unclear, although in context the Obergefell Court’s
seeming dismissal of the Glucksberg test suggests that it is obsolete.
Dissenting in Obergefell, Chief Justice Roberts complained that the
majority had “effectively overrule[d]” Glucksberg;383 and scholars,
such as Laurence Tribe, express the same view.384 Yet a number of
lower courts continue to follow the Glucksberg approach in the postObergefell era, suggesting that it may survive.385 Moreover, given
changes in the Court’s composition since Obergefell was decided, it is
possible that it might revive the Glucksberg standard in a future decision. Accordingly, this Section analyzes the right to establish a home
under the Glucksberg standard.
2. History, Tradition, and Ordered Liberty
The right to establish a home is deeply rooted in our history and
tradition, as discussed in Parts II and III. The comparison with the
asserted right of physician-assisted suicide at issue in Glucksberg is
instructive. There the Court explained in detail how “for over 700
years, the Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or
otherwise disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide.”386 By
contrast, the right to establish a home is a central part of our AngloAmerican legal heritage, from Blackstone’s ancient “right of habita381 Id. at 720–21 (citations omitted) (first quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503; then quoting
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325,•326 (1937); and then quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, 301–02 (1993)).
382

See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 671.

383

Id. at 702 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

384

See Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 16

(2015).
385 See Ronald Turner, W(h)ither Glucksberg?, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 183,
210–15 (2020) (discussing these decisions).
386

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711.
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tion” through the repeated recognition of the right in Obergefell and
other modern Supreme Court decisions.387
Two foundational concepts in American law reflect the right to
establish a home: the right to acquire property and the importance of
the home. The right is implicit in the “pursuit of happiness” provision
of the Declaration of Independence and the home-centric Bill of
Rights.388 After ratification of the Constitution, the federal government took practical steps to fulfill the right by adopting land policies
that allowed settlers to easily obtain land for homes and farms.389 And
when southern states imperiled the right in the post–Civil War era,
Congress adopted both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment, in part, in order to safeguard it.390 Thus, the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to protect the right
to establish a home and understood it to be fundamental to ordered
liberty.391 Ultimately, in Meyer the Court transformed this basic right
from one that was assumed to exist—like the right to eat or breathe—
into an express right protected by the Constitution.
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly stressed the fundamental nature of the right, describing it as one of the “privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men”;392 “an essential part of the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment”;393 and “a central part of the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause.”394
3. Defining the Right
As defined earlier, the right to establish a home means the right
to purchase or lease a house, apartment, or other dwelling as a longterm residence and begin living in that dwelling.395
387

See discussion supra Part II, Section III.A, Section III.B.

388

See supra text accompanying notes 89–104.

R

389

See supra text accompanying notes 115–26.

R

390

See supra text accompanying notes 127–48.

R

This paragraph tracks the historical analysis that the Court in used McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767–78 (2010), to explain why the right to bear arms is a fundamental
right under the Glucksberg test.
391

392

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).

393

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 668 (2015) (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 384 (1978)).
394

395

See supra Section III.B.
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4. Conclusion
The right to establish a home is a fundamental right under the
Glucksberg approach. Indeed, the core requirement of that approach—that the right be “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition”—is a quotation from Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
which recognized the right of a family to live together in a home.396
D. Standard of Review
As noted above, the traditional test for determining whether a
law that infringes a fundamental right survives substantive due process
review is strict scrutiny.397 Under this test, the state has the burden of
establishing that the law serves a compelling governmental interest
and is narrowly drawn to attain that objective.398 Accordingly, courts
will probably use strict scrutiny to evaluate infringement of the right
to establish a home.
In the alternative, courts might utilize a version of intermediate
scrutiny. The use of this test is well established in equal protection
jurisprudence, and requires that a law “serve important governmental
objectives and . . . be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.”399 In such cases, “[t]he burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State.”400 Although the Court has never
explicitly stated that intermediate scrutiny applies to substantive due
process cases involving fundamental rights, it has seemingly used this
standard in certain cases.401
The most analogous decision is Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
where Moore argued that the ordinance “substantially interfered”
with her right to “establish a home and bring up children.”402 Rather
than use strict scrutiny, the Court stated that the appropriate test reSee supra note 298 and accompanying text.
See supra note 292.
398 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977) (right to use contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (right to abortion); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 342–43 (1972) (right to travel).
399 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
400 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
401 The Court has occasionally used intermediate scrutiny in substantive due process cases
involving fundamental rights. See Stephen G. Gilles, Parental (and Grandparental) Rights After
Troxel v. Granville, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 69, 126 (2001); David D. Meyer, The Paradox of
Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527, 536–37 (2000); see also Cody Stoddard, Benjamin
Steiner, Jacqueline Rohrbach, Craig Hemmens & Katherine Bennett, All the Way Home: Assessing the Constitutionality of Juvenile Curfew Laws, 42 AM. J. CRIM. L. 177, 196–98 (2015) (discussing use of intermediate scrutiny by lower courts in substantive due process cases).
402 Brief for Appellant, supra note 266, at 31; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 102, at 826
396
397
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quired it to “examine carefully the importance of the governmental
interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the
challenged regulation”—a formulation that echoes the equal protection approach.403 Similarly, the Court appeared to use a lower standard of review in striking down other laws that infringed on
fundamental rights, as in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (right to abortion) and Troxel v. Granville (right to
bring up children).404 Although it is difficult to distill a precise standard from these cases, in general they seem to consider both the importance of the government interest and its relationship to the law at
issue.
Professor David Meyer attributes the Court’s implicit use of intermediate scrutiny in family privacy cases to the fact that protecting
this right may produce adverse consequences for both the community
and other people, when compared with other fundamental rights
whose exercise have no external impacts, such as the right to vote.405
A similar argument might apply to the right to establish a home because its exercise could have external effects.
V. ENFORCING

THE

RIGHT TO ESTABLISH A HOME: COMBATTING
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING

A. Exclusionary Zoning in Context
Imagine a city where the zoning ordinance prohibits all residential uses except for traditional, detached, single-family homes on oneacre lots.406 B, C, and D are all searching for housing. B, who can only
afford to live in an apartment, cannot reside there. C, who intends to
purchase a detached single-family home, but cannot afford to buy one
on such a large lot, is similarly barred. And D, who plans to place a
manufactured home on a residential lot, cannot move to the city ei(noting that Moore involved “a fundamental right to keep the family together that includes an
extended family”).
403 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); see also Meyer, supra note 401,
at 543 (observing that the Moore Court used a standard midway between the strict scrutiny and
rational basis tests).
404 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (finding regulation
that imposes an “undue burden” on the right to an abortion unconstitutional); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–73 (2000); see also Gilles, supra note 401, at 126 (“Intermediate scrutiny
is . . . the most convincing interpretation of the plurality’s overall approach.”).
405 See Meyer, supra note 401, at 549–51.
406 Belle Terre, New York, is an example of this approach. The entire village is zoned as “A
Residence District.” BELLE TERRE, N.Y., CODE § 170-2. In this district, the only permitted residential use is a “[o]ne-family dwelling[]” on a lot that is “at least one acre” in size. Id. §§ 1705A(1), 170-7.

R

R
R
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ther. These hypothetical situations all present the same question: is
exclusionary zoning an unconstitutional infringement of the right to
establish a home? This Article demonstrates that it is.
Zoning is exclusionary when an ordinance effectively prevents or
substantially impairs the construction of affordable housing for lowincome and moderate-income families.407 Although such zoning can
take many forms, three common techniques are: (1) prohibiting multifamily housing such as apartments, condominiums, and townhouses,408
(2) mandating large lot sizes for detached single-family homes,409 and
(3) barring manufactured homes.410 Less draconian restrictions may
also be exclusionary. For example, a city that zones 95% of its residential land for detached single-family homes has engaged in exclusionary
zoning.411 In practice, exclusionary zoning techniques tend to disproportionately prevent racial and ethnic minorities from moving to a
See 3 AM. L. ZONING § 22:1, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2021); 2 NORMAN WILJR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 66:1 (rev. ed. 2003); see also
Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing Segregation, 37 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 309 (2002) (“Each type of exclusionary zoning has the effect, and often
the purpose, of increasing housing costs, which inevitably reduces the number of affordable units
for low-income persons.”).
408 See, e.g., BELLE TERRE, N.Y., CODE § 170-5A(1) (only permitted form of housing in
village is detached single-family homes). As one study sponsored by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development stated: “[L]imiting multifamily housing through exclusionary zoning . . . is one of the most common and most pervasive barriers to affordable housing in
America.” GERRIT KNAAP, STUART MECK, TERRY MOORE & ROBERT PARKER, AM. PLAN.
ASS’N, ZONING AS A BARRIER TO MULTIFAMILY HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, at v (2007), https://
www.huduser.gov/portal/Publications/pdf/zoning_MultifmlyDev.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8HDLYXB]; see also Richard F. Babcock & Fred P. Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment
Boom, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 1040, 1059–73 (1963) (discussing suburban hostility to apartment
projects).
407

LIAMS,

409 See, e.g., BELLE TERRE, N.Y., CODE § 170-7 (one-acre minimum lot size). One study
showed that 14 of the 187 cities and towns in eastern Massachusetts require minimum lot sizes of
more than 70,000 square feet or 1.625 acres. EDWARD L. GLAESER, JENNY SCHUETZ & BRYCE
WARD, PIONEER INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RSCH., REGULATION AND THE RISE OF HOUSING PRICES
IN GREATER BOSTON: A STUDY BASED ON NEW DATA FROM 187 COMMUNITIES IN EASTERN
MASSACHUSETTS, at ii (2006), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/rappaport/research-and-publications/major-reports/regulations-and-the-rise-in-housing-prices-in-greater-boston [https://
perma.cc/389J-2AL6]. It concluded that each increase in lot size decreased the percentage of
affordable homes. See id. at 34; see also Paul Boudreaux, Lotting Large: The Phenomenon of
Minimum Lot Size Laws, 68 ME. L. REV. 1, 9 (2016) (observing that large lot zoning “inflates the
cost of housing”); Jeffrey Zabel & Maurice Dalton, The Impact of Minimum Lot Size Regulations on House Prices in Eastern Massachusetts, 41 REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 571 (2011) (discussing impact of large lot zoning on prices).
410 See 3 AM. L. ZONING, supra note 407, § 22:2; see also Daniel R. Mandelker, Zoning
Barriers to Manufactured Housing, 48 URB. LAW. 233, 234 (2016) (commenting that “manufactured housing . . . has significant affordability advantages over site-built traditional housing”).
411

See 3 AM. L. ZONING, supra note 407, § 22:2.
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city.412 Moreover, they deprive everyone of the freedom to choose the
type of home they wish to live in.
Under the standard Euclid framework, the validity of a zoning
ordinance is governed by the rational basis test.413 An ordinance is
presumed to be constitutional, and the party challenging its validity
must prove that it is “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”414 In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, the Court described the
standard more succinctly, explaining that such a law will be upheld if it
is “reasonable, not arbitrary” and bears “a rational relationship to a
[permissible] state objective.”415 Under this deferential test, it is extraordinarily difficult to invalidate a zoning ordinance.416
Federal courts and most state courts utilize the rational basis test
to evaluate the constitutionality of exclusionary zoning ordinances,417
412 See NOAH KAZIS, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., ENDING EXCLUSIONARY ZONING IN NEW
YORK CITY’S SUBURBS 7 (2020), https://furmancenter.org/files/Ending_Exclusionary_Zoning_in_
New_York_Citys_Suburbs.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2M3-9VXB]; see also Elliott Anne Rigby, Understanding Exclusionary Zoning and Its Impact on Concentrated Poverty, CENTURY FOUND.
(June 23, 2016), https://tcf.org/content/facts/understanding-exclusionary-zoning-impact-concentrated-poverty [https://perma.cc/C8YR-AR8V].
413 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391 (1926). Euclid was premised
on the Court’s respect for separation of powers; it deferred to the judgment of the village council
which “presumably representing a majority of its inhabitants and voicing their will” had adopted
the ordinance. Id. at 389. In other words, the ballot box is the method to challenge unwise laws.
However, an ordinance that bars people from moving into a community also prevents them from
voting for candidates committed to repealing such laws. Thus, the logic underlying Euclid’s deferential standard of review does not readily apply to exclusionary zoning. Cf. City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“When social or economic legislation is at
issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude and the Constitution presumes
that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.” (citations omitted)).
414 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395.
415 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (alteration in original) (first quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); and then quoting Reed v. Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)).
416 See, e.g., Robert J. Hopperton, The Presumption of Validity in American Land-Use
Law: A Substitute for Analysis, a Source of Significant Confusion, 23 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV.
301, 308 (1996).
417 See, e.g., Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 254 (9th Cir. 1974) (“[T]he
town need only show that the [one-acre minimum lot size] ordinance bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Here the ordinance is rationally related to preserving
the town’s rural environment.” (citation omitted)); Jaylin Invs., Inc. v. Village of Moreland Hills,
839 N.E.2d 903, 906 (Ohio 2006). As one authority summarizes current law: “Since neither a
classification based on wealth nor the necessity of housing triggers ‘strict scrutiny’ review of
exclusionary zoning ordinances, a municipality need only show a minimal rational basis in support of the ordinance.” ARDEN H. RATHKOPF, DAREN A. RATHKOPF & EDWARD H. ZIEGLER,
JR., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 22.3 (4th ed. 2021).
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though a handful of states employ more rigorous standards.418 As a
result, courts have generally upheld such ordinances against substantive due process attack.419 But the Supreme Court has never decided
whether exclusionary zoning violates the Due Process Clause.420 The
fundamental right to establish a home is a powerful tool for challenging such zoning because it invokes a more searching standard of review—either strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny.
This Part first examines when exclusionary zoning techniques infringe the right to establish a home. It then evaluates the justifications
for using these techniques. To avoid duplication, it discusses intermediate scrutiny before strict scrutiny. The analysis below illustrates how
this right can be used to challenge exclusionary zoning as a general
matter.
B. Infringement of the Right
Clearly, a city may regulate the right to establish a home to some
extent. As the Supreme Court noted in Zablocki v. Redhail, “reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere” with a fundamental
right “may legitimately be imposed.”421 It explained that the existence
See, e.g., Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 382 A.2d 105, 111 (Pa. 1977) (“Where the
amount of land zoned as being available for multi-family dwellings is disproportionately small in
relation to [various] factors, the ordinance will be held to be exclusionary.”); S. Burlington Cnty.
NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 724 (N.J. 1975) (“We conclude that
every . . . municipality must, by its land use regulations, presumptively make realistically possible
an appropriate variety and choice of housing.”).
418

419 Exclusionary zoning can also be challenged under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601–3619, where it is proven to have a disparate impact on a racial minority or other group
protected by the Act. See id. §§ 3604–3606. If such a showing is made, the burden shifts to the
defendant city to show that the zoning is “necessary to achieve a valid interest”; and, if so, the
plaintiff can still prevail by showing that the interest could be adequately served by different
policy with a less discriminatory effect. See Tex. Dep’t. of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive
Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 527, 541 (2015). The approach presented in this Article is a
better method for attacking exclusionary zoning because (1) there is no need to prove disparate
impact and (2) the standard of review is more rigorous.
420 In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S.
252 (1977), the Court rejected a claim that the village’s failure to rezone land for multifamily
housing violated the Equal Protection Clause, even though the decision disproportionately affected African Americans. See id. at 269–71. It held that “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent
or purpose is required” to show a violation of the Clause. Id. at 265. This decision significantly
impeded the use of federal litigation to challenge exclusionary zoning under the Equal Protection Clause. See 3 AM. L. ZONING, supra note 407, § 22:4.

Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978). Similarly, in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, the Court observed that “not every law which makes a right more difficult to exercise is,
ipso facto, an infringement of that right.” Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
873 (1992).
421

R
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of a violation depends on “[t]he directness and substantiality of the
interference.”422
The statute in Zablocki mandated that a noncustodial parent obligated to pay child support obtain permission from a court in order to
marry; this necessitated proof that the required payments had been
made. The Court invalidated the statute because it imposed a serious
financial burden on the exercise of the fundamental right to marry. It
noted that some parents “will never be able to obtain the necessary
court order, because they . . . lack the financial means to meet their
support obligations.”423 And even those “able in theory to satisfy the
statute’s requirements[] will be sufficiently burdened by having to do
so that they will in effect be coerced into forgoing their right to
marry.”424 Under the Zablocki logic, the fundamental right to establish a home is infringed when the law imposes a serious financial burden on the exercise of the right.
The national standard for assessing housing affordability was developed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Under this approach, housing is deemed to be affordable if a household spends less than 30% of its income on housing.425 A household
that spends more than this amount is classified as “cost burdened,”
while one that spends more than 50% is considered to be “severely
cost burdened.”426 According to the most recent data, 46.3% of tenants in the United States are cost burdened and 23.9% are severely
cost burdened, while 21.2% of homeowners are cost burdened, and
9% are severely cost burdened.427
Household incomes and housing costs are affected by a variety of
factors. But, at a minimum, where an exclusionary zoning technique
422 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387 n.12; see also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (the
statutory definition of “household” for purposes of food stamp eligibility did not “ ‘directly and
substantially’ interfere with family living arrangements and thereby burden a fundamental right”
because “in the overwhelming majority of cases” it would have no effect on whether close relatives chose to live together (quoting Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387)).
423 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387.
424 Id.
425 J. David Hulchanski, The Concept of Housing Affordability: Six Contemporary Uses of
the Housing Expenditure-to-Income Ratio, 10 HOUS. STUD. 471, 475–86 (1995) (discussing standard); see also CHAS: Background, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV.: OFF. OF POL’Y DEV. &
RSCH., https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/cp/CHAS/bg_chas.html [https://perma.cc/M5FVW29D] (discussing standards used in the Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy).
426 HARVARD UNIV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING
2020, at 1 (2020), https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/reports/files/Harvard_JCHS_
The_State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2020_Report_Revised_120720.pdf [https://perma.cc/
M6NM-AJMV].
427 Id. at 34.
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increases the cost of housing to the point where a household is severely cost burdened—paying more than 50% of its income—an infringement of the right to establish a home should be found.
For example, consider a hypothetical family with income of
$36,000 per year that wants to live in a city which bars multifamily
housing. It could afford to pay up to $1,499 in rent each month without being severely cost burdened; and apartments charging this level
of rent could be profitably built in the city. But the minimum cost to
rent a detached home in the city—the only type of housing available
because of exclusionary zoning—is $2,400 per month; such a rental
would consume 80% of the family’s annual income. In a situation like
this, the excess cost caused by exclusionary zoning severely burdens
the right to establish a home.428 Under the Zablocki framework, the
added cost is so high that the family is “coerced into forgoing” the
right.429
More broadly, exclusionary zoning ordinances infringe the right
to obtain a home in a different sense—by depriving people of the freedom to live in the type of home they prefer. For instance, consider a
city where the only permitted residential use is a conventional detached single-family house on a large lot. In this situation, the city has
prohibited almost all the housing alternatives that most cities allow,
including apartments, townhouses, condominiums, detached homes on
smaller lots, and manufactured homes. An individual, couple, or family who can afford to live in a single-family home on a large lot might
strongly prefer to live in a different type of home, such as an apartment or single-family home on a small lot. Under the Zablocki standard,430 ordinances that drastically curtail the range of available
housing choices directly and substantially interfere with the right to
establish a home.

428 The same approach applies to the purchase of a home. For example, one study of housing costs in Washington, D.C. showed that a lot occupied by a traditional single-family home
could instead accommodate six condominium units. See JENNY SCHUETZ, BROOKINGS INST., TO
IMPROVE HOUSING AFFORDABILITY, WE NEED BETTER ALIGNMENT OF ZONING, TAXES, AND
SUBSIDIES 2–4 (2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Schuetz_Policy20
20_BigIdea_Improving-Housing-Afforability.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP7N-MDLM]. In order to
purchase the traditional home, a buyer would have to pay $1,000,000. Id. But a developer could
profitably acquire that home, demolish it, build condominium units, and sell each unit for
$579,472—which would substantially expand the number of people who could afford to buy a
home. Id.
429

See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387.

430

Id.
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C. Standard of Review: Intermediate Scrutiny
1. Overview
The Supreme Court has not clearly delineated the intermediate
scrutiny test sometimes used in substantive due process cases, as discussed above.431 The analysis below uses the test set forth in Moore v.
City of East Cleveland—the case that comes closest to applying the
fundamental right to establish a home.432 In Moore, the Court held
that “when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living arrangements” a court must “examine carefully the importance of
the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are
served by the challenged regulation.”433
The question is not whether a city may establish zones where the
only uses are detached single-family houses on large lots. Such zoning
is certainly permissible. A city that zones most of its residential land
for such houses but also permits duplexes and other multifamily
dwellings, houses on smaller lots, and manufactured homes in at least
some areas has not engaged in exclusionary zoning. Rather, the question is whether total or near exclusion of all residential uses other than
detached homes on large lots is constitutional.
Under the intermediate scrutiny test, the challenged law is not
presumed to be constitutional. For instance, in Moore the Court
placed the burden of justifying the ordinance on the city.434 This approach is consistent with the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence,
which requires that the government bear the “demanding” burden of
establishing that the law is constitutional.435 Thus, a city cannot rely on
speculation or surmise, but instead must present proof that the ordinance serves “important” interests.436
2. Prohibition of Multifamily Housing
Ordinances banning multifamily housing may be defended on the
basis that such housing increases density—and consequently produces
traffic, noise, and similar impacts.437 Although the Supreme Court
held in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. that density concerns
provided a rational basis for excluding apartment buildings from sin431
432
433
434
435
436
437

See supra Section IV.D.
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499–500 (1977).
Id. at 499.
See id. at 499–500.
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
See id.
See 3 AM. L. ZONING, supra note 407, § 22:13.

R
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gle-family zones, it also acknowledged that “in a different environment [apartments] would be not only entirely unobjectionable but
highly desirable.”438 Thus, Euclid suggests that entirely excluding multifamily housing from a city would not even meet the rational basis
test.
In any event, all forms of development—commercial, industrial,
recreational, and otherwise—produce density impacts. A city can
hardly have a strong interest in avoiding density impacts if it permits
them for other types of uses, especially when compared with the importance of the right to a home. Indeed, the vast majority of zoning
ordinances expressly permit duplexes, apartments, and other forms of
multifamily housing,439 indicating that density concerns are not
significant.440
Even assuming that avoiding density impacts is an important government interest, a ban on all forms of multifamily housing does not
closely serve that interest. To paraphrase the Court’s analysis in
Moore, an exclusionary zoning ordinance could allow a family consisting of a “husband, wife, and unmarried children to live together [in a
detached single-family home], even if the family contain[ed] a half
dozen licensed drivers, each with his or her own car.”441 Yet, as the
Court observed, such an ordinance could ban the construction of a
duplex shared by an adult brother and sister, each “faithfully us[ing]
public transportation.”442 Such an ordinance serves density-related
goals “marginally, at best.”443
Cities sometimes assert fiscal concerns to justify such bans. They
argue, incorrectly, that multifamily housing does not generate enough
tax revenue to pay for the city services that the inhabitants need.444 As
a Harvard University study concluded: “[R]ather than imposing a
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
See NAT’L MULTIFAMILY HOUS. COUNCIL, THE HOUSING AFFORDABILITY TOOLKIT 37
(2021) (noting that 15% of the housing stock in the United States is multifamily rental housing).
440 The Moore Court noted that limiting density impacts was a “legitimate” goal but did not
evaluate its relative importance. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499–500
(1977).
441 Id. at 500.
442 Id.
443 Id.
444 See Pat Dugan, But What About Multiple Family Housing: Does it Pay for Itself?, MUN.
RSCH. & SERVS. CTR. OF WASH. (Mar. 1, 2012), https://mrsc.org/Home/Stay-Informed/MRSCInsight/Archives/But-What-About-Multiple-Family-Housing-Does-it-Pay.aspx [https://perma.cc/
X8R5-2W3D] (“It is commonly perceived that single family dwellings generate more tax revenue per unit . . . than multiple family developments generate. This is not a very accurate perception.”). The Moore Court commented that “avoiding an undue financial burden” was a
“legitimate” goal but did not assess its relative importance. Moore, 431 U.S. at 500.
438
439
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greater burden on local governments, higher density developments
like apartments are actually more fiscally prudent than traditional
suburban sprawl.”445 Moreover, a city can readily raise taxes to fund
these services if needed.446 Local governments have financed their operations through taxation for centuries. Most cities across the nation
have successfully surmounted any arguable fiscal challenges that these
developments might pose. Even assuming that allowing duplexes or
other types of multifamily housing might strain local finances, this
concern is far less important than the right to a home.
For example, in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,447 the New Jersey Supreme Court utilized a
heightened standard of review—based on state law—to invalidate an
ordinance that prohibited all multifamily housing, despite the township’s financial concerns.448 It explained: “We have no hesitancy in
now saying . . . that, considering the basic importance of the opportunity for appropriate housing for all classes of our citizenry, no municipality may exclude or limit categories of housing for that reason or
purpose.”449
Further, a ban on all forms of multifamily housing has only a
“tenuous relation” to fiscal concerns.450 For example, five adult family
members could reside in a traditional single-family house, while only
two people might live in a duplex, one per unit. Thus, the duplex adds
only two people consuming government services, while the house adds
five—a 250% increase.
A third potential claim is that multifamily housing will lower
property values.451 However, as scholars have observed, “[l]and values
in most existing apartment areas are very high . . . [and] there is little
evidence that an apartment per se will detract from the value of sur445 MARK OBRINSKY & DEBRA STEIN, HARVARD UNIV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUD.,
OVERCOMING OPPOSITION TO MULTIFAMILY RENTAL HOUSING 8 (2007), https://
www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/rr07-14_obrinsky_stein.pdf [https://perma.cc/
Z8M9-EZWX]; see also Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 408, at 1062 (“[I]t is clear that multiple-family housing per se does not have any particular effect on municipal finance.”).

R

446 See Nat’l Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 610 (Pa. 1965) (“Zoning provisions
may not be used . . . to avoid the . . . economic burdens which time and natural growth invariably
bring.”).
447

336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).

448

See id. at 724–25.

449

Id. at 731.

See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500 (1977) (noting that the ordinance
had only a “tenuous relation” to the city’s interests).
450

451

See 3 AM. L. ZONING, supra note 407, § 22:14.

R
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rounding land.”452 Of course, in theory any new development might
affect the value of nearby properties to some extent. For example, a
new shopping center or factory might slightly lower the value of adjacent single-family homes; yet cities routinely approve developments
like these, even if they are far more likely to reduce property values
than, for example, a duplex. More broadly, property values fluctuate
over time for many reasons. Concern that multiunit housing lowers
these values is often mere speculation, based on fear rather than facts,
and cannot outweigh the importance of the right to a home.
Finally, even if this were a strong state interest, any impact on the
value of nearby houses can be mitigated by standard planning techniques, such as creating buffer zones between uses, installing landscaping and other visual screening, and requiring building designs that
harmonize with single-family uses.453 Accordingly, a complete ban on
all multifamily dwellings serves this goal only marginally.
3. Large Lot Size Requirements
In Euclid, the Court observed that there was “no serious difference of opinion” about the validity of certain aspects of the ordinance—including the lot size requirements for single-family houses.454
Because the ordinance only mandated minimum lot sizes between 700
and 5,000 square feet, it was reasonable to view them as measures to
address density concerns.455 By contrast, some modern ordinances demand a minimum size of one acre—more than eight times bigger than
the largest Euclid lot—while others require two acres or more. As one
authority concludes, these requirements do not even have a rational
relationship to density concerns because they exceed “even the arguable needs of health, safety, and morals.”456 By definition, such density
arguments cannot satisfy the more searching intermediate scrutiny
test.
452 Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 408, at 1067; see also OBRINSKY & STEIN, supra note
445, at 12 (“[M]ultifamily housing rental developments do not generally lower property values in
surrounding areas.”).
453 See, e.g., Appeal of Girsh, 263 A.2d 395, 399 (Pa. 1970) (“Certainly [a city] can protect
its attractive character by requiring apartments to be built in accordance with (reasonable) setback, open space, height, and other light-and-air requirements . . . .”); cf. Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v.
Shidel, 795 So. 2d 191, 193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (involving requirement that portions of
multifamily housing project use “compatible structure types” on land adjacent to single-family
homes).
454 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
455 See id. at 381–82.
456 1 AM. L. ZONING, supra note 407, § 7:20.

R
R

R
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More commonly, large lot zoning is defended on the rather elusive basis that it preserves the “rural character” of the area. For example, in Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills,457 the Ninth Circuit held
that requiring a one-acre lot met the rational basis test because it preserved “the town’s rural environment.”458 But using a more demanding standard of review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated a
similar requirement in National Land & Investment Co. v. Kohn.459 It
explained:
There is no doubt that many of the residents of this area are
highly desirous of keeping it the way it is, preferring, quite
naturally, to look out upon land in its natural state rather
than on other homes. . . . [But] [t]his is purely a matter of
private desire which zoning regulations may not be employed to effectuate.
....
The . . . argument . . . is that the rural character of the area
must be preserved. If the township were developed on the
basis of this zoning, however, it could not be seriously contended that the land would retain its rural character—it
would simply be dotted with larger homes on larger lots.460
Similarly, under intermediate scrutiny, the governmental interest in
using large lot zoning to maintain rural character is weak at best, particularly when compared with the important interest underlying the
right to a home.
Further, large lot zoning has only a tenuous connection with the
goal of maintaining the rural character of a region. This goal is better
served by allowing cluster zoning, by which housing units are grouped
together as condominiums, townhouses, or homes on small lots—thus
allowing rural areas to remain devoted to agricultural and other nonresidential uses.

457

503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).

458

Id. at 254.

459

215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965).

Id. at 611–12; see also C & M Devs., Inc. v. Bedminster Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 820
A.2d 143, 158 (Pa. 2002) (ordinance that mandated one-acre minimum lot size in rural area was
not “attempting to preserve agriculture, but rather . . . improperly attempting to exclude people”); Hock v. Bd. of Supervisors, 622 A.2d 431, 435 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993) (“[M]aintaining the
rural character of the township does not constitute a sufficient justification for the minimum lot
requirement.”).
460
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4. Prohibition of Manufactured Homes
The modern successor to the mobile home is the “manufactured
home.” Under federal law, a manufactured home is a dwelling unit
that is constructed in a factory—including electrical, heating, and
plumbing systems—and then transported to a site where it is installed.461 Congress has recognized that manufactured homes are a
“significant resource for affordable homeownership and rental housing accessible to all Americans.”462 However, zoning ordinances in
some cities prohibit the use of manufactured homes.463
Cities may argue that they have an interest in excluding manufactured homes due to aesthetics. Aesthetic concern is generally recognized as a rational basis for zoning regulation. But today “[w]elldesigned double-wide manufactured homes with conventional siding,
roofing materials, and acceptable roof pitch are almost indistinguishable from traditional site-built homes of the same price and quality.”464 Moreover, ordinances often restrict manufactured homes to
special zones where only those types of homes are permitted so that
they are visually shielded from the public;465 in this situation, aesthetic
issues are irrelevant. Finally, any lingering aesthetic concerns can be
addressed by regulating the appearance of these homes.466
Another possible claim is that manufactured housing will lower
property values.467 But the analysis above concerning the supposed
See 42 U.S.C. § 5402(6) for a more detailed definition.
42 U.S.C. § 5401(a)(2). Manufactured housing provides over 6% of the national housing
stock. Mandelker, supra note 410, at 235.
463 See Mandelker, supra note 410, at 237; see also CASEY J. DAWKINS, C. THEODORE
KOEBEL, MARILYN CAVELL, STEVE HULLIBARGER, DAVID B. HATTIS & HOWARD WEISSMAN,
CTR. FOR HOUS. RSCH., REGULATORY BARRIERS TO MANUFACTURED HOUSING PLACEMENT IN
URBAN COMMUNITIES 19 (2011) (noting that 8% of survey respondents indicated that their jurisdictions excluded manufactured homes). In addition, some cities permit manufactured homes in
special zones but bar them from single-family home zones; the analysis in this section applies
equally to such ordinances.
464 Mandelker, supra note 410, at 239.
465 See, e.g., OCALA, FLA., CODE § 122-287.
466 See, e.g., Ga. Manufactured Hous. Ass’n v. Spalding Cnty., 148 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th
Cir. 1998) (citing Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 923–24 (11th Cir. 1995)) (upholding
zoning regulation requiring manufactured homes to be built with 4:12 roof pitch under rational
basis test).
467 For example, in Texas Manufacturers Housing Ass’n v. City of La Porte, 974 F. Supp.
602 (S.D. Tex. 1996), the court used the rational basis test to reject a challenge to an ordinance
barring manufactured homes from zones for single-family detached houses. See id. It noted the
defendant’s argument that such housing “may lead to a decrease in property values,” even
though there was no evidence supporting this conclusion. See id. at 606. It concluded, “Plaintiff
has not satisfied its burden of negating every conceivable rational basis for the Ordinance’s exclusion.” Id. at 607.
461
462

R
R

R
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impact of multifamily housing on values applies equally here.468 Research tends to show that manufactured homes do not negatively affect the value of nearby properties.469 As one scholar concludes
“[w]ell-designed and well-maintained manufactured housing built to
national standards should not have a negative effect on the value of
neighboring property.”470
Finally, one traditional objection to mobile homes and other early
forms of manufactured housing was safety. For example, conventional
homes are less likely to be affected by fire or tornadoes.471 However,
federal law has established the safety standards for manufactured
homes in recent decades, thereby preempting local ordinances.472 As a
result, a city may not exclude manufactured homes based on safety
concerns if they meet federal code requirements.473
D. Standard of Review: Strict Scrutiny
1. Overview
Under the strict scrutiny test, the government has the burden to
prove that the law serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly
tailored to obtain that objective.474 The Supreme Court has never provided criteria for determining when a compelling state interest exists.475 Its decisions certainly suggest that there must be a “truly vital
interest.”476 For example, the Court has indicated that safeguarding
human health,477 maintaining medical standards,478 ensuring proper
care for children,479 and winning a war480 all qualify as compelling state
interests. In order to show that the law is narrowly tailored, a city has
See supra notes 451–52 and accompanying text.
See Mandelker, supra note 410, at 237–38 (summarizing research studies). For instance,
in Anstine v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of York Twp., 190 A.2d 712, 717 (Pa. 1963), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that the record showed that locating a mobile home in the zone at
issue “will enhance the value of the surrounding property.”
470 Mandelker, supra note 410, at 238–39.
471 See, e.g., Torie Bosch, How to Tornado-Proof Your Mobile Home, SLATE (Nov. 8, 2005,
3:59 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2005/11/tornado-proofing-your-mobile-home.html
[https://perma.cc/55EQ-ECNU] (discussing the risks of remaining in a manufactured home during a tornado).
472 See 42 U.S.C. § 5403(d).
473 See, e.g., Scurlock v. City of Lynn Haven, 858 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1988).
474 See supra text accompanying notes 397–98.
475 See Fallon, supra note 292, at 1321–22.
476 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 102, at 817.
477 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
478 Id.
479 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978).
480 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219–20 (1944).
468
469
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the burden of proving that there is no “alternative, less intrusive”
method that could be used to satisfy the government interest.481
2. Prohibition of Multifamily Housing
The justifications offered for prohibiting multifamily housing—
density, finances, and property value—cannot satisfy the intermediate
scrutiny test, as discussed above. By definition, they also cannot meet
the more demanding strict scrutiny test. Although these are all rational bases for regulation, it cannot be seriously argued that they are
compelling state interests such as protecting human health, providing
proper care for children, or winning a war.482
Moreover, these interests can be satisfied by less intrusive methods. Density concerns, for example, can be addressed by regulating
the number of people who may live in each unit, rather than the types
of housing units that are allowed.483 City finance issues can easily be
avoided by raising money through taxation. And basic planning techniques such as buffer zones, visual screening, and architectural design
measures can ensure that multifamily housing projects do not impact
property values.
3. Large Lot Size Requirements
Large lot size requirements are invalid under the intermediate
scrutiny test, as discussed above, despite arguments based on density484 and rural character.485 Again, by definition, these interests are
far less compelling than, for example, winning a war, and thus would
not meet the strict scrutiny test.
In addition, less intrusive techniques can be used to preserve the
rural character of a region. The local government could condemn development rights in the region,486 rezone the area exclusively for agricultural use, or allow cluster zoning. All three approaches would be
more effective than authorizing large homes on large lots.
481

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 102, at 817.

R

See, e.g., Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1345 (Colo. 1994) (preservation of fiscal resources is not a compelling state interest).
482

483 Cf. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500–01 (1977) (explaining why ordinance was overbroad, based on number of household residents).
484

See supra notes 437–43, 456 and accompanying text.

R

485

See supra notes 457–60 and accompanying text.

R

See Nat’l Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 611 (Pa. 1965) (suggesting condemnation and cluster zoning approaches).
486
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4. Prohibition of Manufactured Homes
Just as the interests advanced to defend bans on manufactured
homes do not satisfy the intermediate scrutiny standard, they are also
insufficient under the strict scrutiny standard. Concern for aesthetics
and property values do not constitute compelling state interests.487
Again, these concerns can be adequately addressed through alternative methods. A city can deal with aesthetic concerns by regulating
the appearance, location, and landscaping for manufactured homes so
that they easily blend in with traditional, single-family homes and
other uses. The same techniques will address any possible impact on
property values.
E. Summary
In sum, the exclusionary zoning techniques discussed above—
prohibition of multifamily housing, large lot size requirements, and
prohibition of manufactured homes—probably violate the fundamental right to establish a home.
Although the government interests typically advanced to justify
these techniques admittedly meet the deferential rational basis test,
they cannot satisfy the intermediate scrutiny test when weighed
against the vital importance of the right to establish a home, particularly because the city has the burden of persuasion. Moreover, assuming arguendo that such an interest is strong, it is not closely served by
the technique.
Nor can any of these techniques satisfy the strict scrutiny standard. Interests such as density, aesthetics, finances, rural character,
and property value are simply not compelling state interests. And
these techniques are not narrowly tailored to serve such interests.
CONCLUSION
For almost a century, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
the Due Process Clause encompasses the right to establish a home.
But the right has rarely been used and remains underdeveloped,
thereby contributing to the shortage of affordable housing. History,
tradition, and logic compel the conclusion that the right to establish a
home should be recognized as a fundamental right.
It is time to reassess the twentieth-century approach to residential
zoning. The broad language of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
487 See, e.g., Neighborhood Enters., Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 644 F.3d 728, 737–38 (8th Cir.
2011) (aesthetic protection is not a compelling state interest).
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was pressed into service to legitimize cities where only the wealthy can
reside.488 However, as Justice Stanley Mosk once declared, “total exclusion of people from a community is both immoral and illegal.”489
Exclusionary zoning unduly burdens the fundamental right to establish a home, and accordingly should be declared unconstitutional.

See supra notes 239–46, 406–12 and accompanying text.
Associated Homebuilders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d
473, 497 (Cal. 1976) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
488
489
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